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AMERICANS ABROAD: INTERNATIONAL 
EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS AND TORT 
LIABILITY 
VINCENT R. JOHNSON*
I. LIABILITY IN PERSPECTIVE 
In recent decades, the number of foreign programs operated by American 
colleges and universities has greatly expanded.1  Higher education institutions now 
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 1. According to the Institute of International Education, “[i]n academic year 2003/2004, 
191,321 U.S. students studied abroad, an increase of 9.6% from the previous year” and twice as 
many as a decade earlier.  Open Doors: U.S. Study Abroad, http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p= 
69702.  Study abroad programs span a wide range of disciplines, see Open Doors: U.S. Study 
Abroad, Fields of Study, http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=71103, and all parts of the globe, see 
Open Doors: U.S. Study Abroad, Host Regions, http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=69707.  In 
New Jersey, for example, “colleges and universities have developed study abroad or exchange 
options that can place students in more than 50 countries around the world.”  The New Student 
Rush is to Go Overseas, N.J. REC., Sept. 4, 2005, at T1.  “Increasing numbers of American 
colleges and universities are operating their own programs overseas, rather than merely sending 
their students to study at overseas universities.”  John E. Watson, Practical Risk Management in 
International Study: Limiting Risks, Crisis Management, and Administrative Practice, URMIA J. 
7, 8 (2002). 
The students who participate in study abroad programs are overwhelmingly enrolled at the 
undergraduate level and roughly two-thirds are female.  See Open Doors: U.S. Study Abroad, 
U.S. Student Profile, http://opendoors.iienetwork.org/?p=69715 (collecting statistics from 
academic year 1993–94 to academic year 2003–04).  However, in some professional fields of 
education, study abroad is robust.  American law schools, for example, now operate ten semester 
abroad programs and 197 foreign summer programs approved by the American Bar Association.  
See CONSULTANT ON LEGAL EDUCATION TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 2004–2005 
ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2005); Lindsay Fortado, Thinking Globally: Law Schools Expand 
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offer a multitude of classes, internships, or study tours conducted wholly or 
partially outside the United States.2  These educational ventures are the most 
recent incarnations of the rich liberal arts tradition of learning through travel,3 an 
idea that can be traced back to the days of The Grand Tour, to the work of the 
scholar Erasmus, and indeed back to the ancient Greeks.  Herodotus (484–25 
B.C.), “the father of history,” learned about other countries by traveling around 
most of the known world.4  Two thousand years later, Erasmus (1465–1536), “[a]n 
untiring adversary of dogmatic thought in all fields of human endeavor, . . . lived 
and worked in several parts of Europe, in quest of the knowledge, experience and 
insights which only such contacts with other countries could bring.”5  Between the 
sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, it became fashionable for young men and 
women from well-bred families in England and elsewhere to finish their education 
by traveling to France and Italy to study art and culture.6   
Today, study abroad is conducted on a scale that is typically more common and 
frugal than grand and elite, but it is also more robust than ever before.7  The vast 
majority of American colleges and universities now say that study abroad is a 
valuable academic option.8  Some institutions even treat a foreign educational 
International Curricula, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 6, 2006, at 1 (stating that “[n]early all law schools now 
offer at least one overseas study or ‘study abroad’ opportunity”). 
 2. See generally William P. Hoye & Gary M. Rhodes, An Ounce of Prevention is Worth . . 
. The Life of a Student: Reducing Risk in International Programs, 27 J.C. & U.L. 151, 153 (2000) 
(discussing the growth of international programs). 
 3. “Perhaps travel cannot prevent bigotry, but by demonstrating that all peoples cry, laugh, 
eat, worry, and die, it can introduce the idea that if we try and understand each other, we may 
even become friends.”  MAYA ANGELOU, WOULDN’T TAKE NOTHING FOR MY JOURNEY NOW 12 
(1993). 
 4. See THOMAS CAHILL, SAILING THE WINE-DARK SEA 188–89 (2003) (discussing 
Herodotus’s “insatiable curiosity”).  See also Herodotus—Who Were the Greek Historians?, 
http://ancienthistory.about.com/od/herodotus/p/Herodotus.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006) 
(discussing Greek historians and Herodotus in particular).  Of course, Macro Polo’s travels in the 
late thirteenth century set a high benchmark for what can be learned through travel and disbursed 
by authorship.  “[N]ever before or since has one man given such an immense body of new 
geographical knowledge to the West.”  JOHN LARNER, MARCO POLO AND THE DISCOVERY OF 
THE WORLD 1 (1999). 
 5. European Union Erasmus Program for Higher Education, http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
education/programmes/socrates/erasmus/what_en.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).   
 6. “Beginning in the late sixteenth century, it became fashionable for young aristocrats to 
visit Paris, Venice, Florence, and above all Rome, as the culmination of their classical education.  
Thus was born the idea of the Grand Tour, a practice which introduced Englishmen, Germans, 
Scandinavians, and also Americans to the art and culture of France and Italy for the next 300 
years.”  Metropolitan Museum of Art, Time Line of Art History: The Grand Tour, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/grtr/hd_grtr.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
 7. ARTHUR FROMMER, ARTHUR FROMMER’S NEW WORLD OF TRAVEL xiv (5th ed. 1996) 
(noting that this is “the first generation in human history to fly to other continents as easily as 
people once boarded a train to the next town, . . . the first generation . . . for whom travel is not 
restricted to an affluent few”). 
 8. “Yale College encourages students to spend all or part of their junior year studying in an 
approved program abroad.”  Yale College Programs of Study, Chapter III: Special Arrangements 
2005–2006, available at http://www.yale.edu/yalecollege/publications/ycps/chapter_iii/ special. 
html. 
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experience as an integral and required part of earning a degree.9
For reasons ranging from enhanced student recruitment10 to national security11 
and economic competitiveness,12 there is reason to expect the number and size of 
foreign educational programs to increase.  Indeed, study abroad is now recognized 
as an important component in promoting American ideals around the globe.  As 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recently remarked, “every American studying 
abroad is an ambassador for our nation, an individual who represents the true 
nature of our people and the principles of freedom and democracy for which we 
stand. . . . [W]e must work together to expand existing programs with proven 
records of success.”13
The proliferation of collegiate international study has been paralleled in 
American society by heightened concerns—sometimes ill-founded14—about the 
risks of tort liability.15  Thus, it is not surprising that “program providers”16 
 9. See Danna Harman, Harvard (Finally) Gets a Passport, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Mar. 15, 2005, at 14 (discussing “[a] new requirement . . . that every Harvard undergraduate get[] 
a ‘significant’ overseas experience, be it work, research, or study”); Holli Chmela, Foreign 
Detour En Route to a College Degree, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at B9 (stating that in Maryland 
“[s]tudy abroad has been an option for Goucher College students for 25 years.  Beginning next 
fall, it will be mandatory”).  “The Notre Dame Rome Studies Program is the only year-long 
foreign studies program among American university architecture schools that is required for all its 
students.”  University of Notre Dame School of Architecture’s Year In Rome Program, 
http://architecture.nd.edu/academic_programs/year_in_rome.shtml (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).  
The University of Denver has a study abroad requirement for students majoring in International 
Studies.  See University of Denver’s Bachelor of Arts in International Studies Major, 
http://www.du.edu/gsis/undergrad/major.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
 10. See Chmela, supra note 9 (discussing how study abroad affects college and university 
recruitment). 
 11. See Michael Janofsky, Bush Proposes Broader Language Training, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2006, at A15 (discussing how foreign language training can “play a critical role in national 
security”). 
 12. See Steve Ivey, Study Abroad Seen as Diplomatic Tool, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, 
Nov. 14, 2005 (stating that “[g]iving more American college students an international education 
is key to addressing the United States’ increasing security and diplomacy challenges in the 
Middle East and economic challenges from China and India”). 
 13. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Remarks to the U.S. University Presidents 
Summit on International Education (Jan. 5, 2006). 
 14. PETER A. BELL & JEFFREY O’CONNELL, ACCIDENTAL JUSTICE: THE DILEMMAS OF 
TORT LAW 188–89 (1997) (discussing how massive campaigns to impugn the tort system 
influence and distort public perceptions about liability for accidental harm). 
 15. See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
12 (1988) (discussing the tort “revolution”), reviewed by Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating 
Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability,  83 NW. U. L. REV. 1026 (1989) 
(stating that “if Huber is to be believed, the current plague of tort liability has all but idled the 
engines of progress and stripped the shelves of consumer goods”); see also JAY M. FEINMAN, 
UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL BACK THE COMMON LAW 19 
(2004) (discussing the conservative campaign to reshape tort law to reduce the threat of legal 
liability for harm caused by accidents). 
 16. This article will use the term “program provider” to encompass the entire range of 
international education program providers, except when the context calls for more specific 
terminology.  For example, certain rules of law discuss the duties owed by a college or university 
to its students.  See infra text accompanying notes 201-03.  Those principles may not apply to 
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(including colleges, universities, consortia, companies, and individuals)17 have 
focused increasingly on the threat of being sued for damages based on actions or 
omissions related to college and university activities generally18 or to study abroad 
in particular.19  Until lately, there were few reported cases involving claims arising 
from foreign educational ventures.20  However, several recent disputes are now 
memorialized in court opinions.  Students have sued foreign program providers 
for: 
• negligent supervision of medical care provided to a student in 
Austria;21 
• breach of fiduciary duty and other torts relating to discrimination based 
on disabilities in a program which “required participants to spend 
much of their time exploring the Australian continent;”22 
other forms of program providers. 
 17. For example, in Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd., an action 
arising from injuries sustained by a student in an overseas educational program, there were three 
defendants.  118 Cal. App. 4th 1447, 1450 (Ct. App. 2004).  The first was a California 
community college which had entered a contract with certain corporate entities relating to its 
program in Italy.  Id. at 1453.  The second was a U.K. company, which functioned “much like a 
tour operator in . . . making arrangements with travel suppliers, accommodation suppliers, and 
other logistical suppliers.”  Id. at 1450.  The third was a California mutual benefit company which 
was affiliated with the U.K. company and which entered into contracts with California 
educational institutions, including the defendant community college, and individual California 
students who wished to participate in study abroad programs.  Id. at 1452. 
 18. See Jane A. Dall, Note, Determining Duty in Collegiate Tort Litigation: Shifting 
Paradigms of the College-Student Relationship, 29 J.C. & U.L. 485, 485 (2003) (discussing 
increased tort litigation against colleges and universities and the “unsatisfying quagmire of case 
law” faced by administrators charged with developing policies and procedures). 
 19. See Susan Gilbert, Study Abroad: Getting Younger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2002, § 5, at 
2 (stating that “[t]here’s an increased concern by students and their parents about safety as a 
critical component in making a final decision about study abroad” and as a result “the industry 
has updated its safety and security recommendations to study-abroad-program administrators”); 
cf. “Floating University” Will Move to U.Va., RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Dec. 21, 2005, 
at K2 (discussing plans to move a cruise ship study program to the University of Virginia after 
the prior sponsor, the University of Pittsburgh, expressed concerns about the ship’s safety 
following a 2005 accident).  
 20. See William P. Hoye, Comment, The Legal Liability Risk Associated with International 
Study Abroad Programs, 131 EDUC. L. REP. 7, 8 (Feb. 4, 1999) (noting “few reported court 
decisions”). 
 21. McNeil v. Wagner Coll., 667 N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. Div. 1998).  See infra text 
accompanying note 221 (discussing the unsuccessful claim).   
 22. Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002).  The student alleged 
“(1) violation of the [federal Rehabilitation Act], (2) violation of Title III of the [Americans with 
Disabilities Act], (3) breach of contract, (4) breach of fiduciary duty, (5) defamation, (6) 
negligence, (7) fraud, (8) negligent misrepresentation, and (9) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.”  Id. at 1019.  The Ninth Circuit found that “[a]ll of the claims essentially share[d] one 
premise: during Bird’s stay in Australia, the College discriminated against her on the basis of 
disability by failing to provide her with wheelchair access.”  Id.  The trial court had granted 
summary judgment for the college on the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claims.  Id.  “The jury found against [the student] on all but the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim for which it awarded her $5,000.”  Id.  The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  Id. at 1023.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 248–252 (discussing Bird). 
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• negligence relating to injuries sustained by a student when he fell from 
an apartment house balcony where he resided while participating in a 
program in Italy;23 
• “abandoning” an American female student at a Peruvian clinic where 
male doctors performed unnecessary surgery and took sexual liberties 
with her;24 and 
• negligence pertaining to sexual-assault injuries sustained by a student 
in a cultural immersion program in Mexico.25 
There was another reported case in which women alleged indifference on the 
part of the administrators of a study abroad program in South Africa to their 
complaints of abuse.26  Such a claim may, alternatively, have been brought for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.  Courts have occasionally held that 
failure to respond appropriately to allegations of discriminatory treatment may 
constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that can support a tort action for 
damages.27
 23. Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759, 761 
n.1, 766 (Ct. App. 2004) (indicating that a student who was injured in a six-story fall from a 
residential balcony while participating in an overseas educational program stipulated to the 
dismissal of his claim against an American community college but established general 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which had arranged the accommodations). 
 24. Fay v. Thiel Coll., 55 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 367 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) (holding that an 
exculpatory clause contained in the waiver of liability form signed by the student was not valid 
and that the college owed the plaintiff a special duty of care pursuant to the terms of a consent 
form the student was required to sign). 
 25. Bloss v. Univ. of Minn. Bd. of Regents, 590 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).  A 
student who was raped by a taxi driver “sued the University for negligence in its failure to secure 
housing closer to the [foreign program] campus, failure to provide transportation to and from 
campus, failure to adequately warn about risks, and failure to protect students from foreseeable 
harm.”  Id. at 663.  The appellate court held that the student’s claim failed because the university 
had demonstrated that it was “entitled to statutory immunity in the exercise of its discretionary 
decision to create a cultural immersion program that placed students in host homes, relied on 
available public transportation, and provided a variety of student warnings and information.”  Id. 
at 667. 
 26. King v. Bd. of Control of E. Mich. Univ., 221 F. Supp. 2d 783, 791 (E.D. Mich. 2002) 
(opining that “[s]tudy abroad programs are an integral part of college education today” and that 
“[a] denial of equal opportunity in those programs has ramifications on students’ education as a 
whole and detracts from their overall education”). 
 27. See Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 586 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that a corporation’s 
failure to take appropriate action in response to an employee’s allegation of sexual harassment by 
a manager constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress).  See also Manning v. Metro. 
Life Ins., 127 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that whether an employer’s alleged toleration of 
sexual harassment by a supervisor and coworker constituted the tort of outrage was question for 
jury).  But see Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (holding that 
a “handful of off-color jokes did not show employer fostered a culture that encouraged extreme 
and outrageous conduct”); Martin v. Baer, 928 F.2d 1067 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that failure to 
investigate rumors of sexual harassment was at most a negligent omission); Ammon v. Baron 
Auto. Group, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1293 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding that an alleged lack of response to 
sexually abusive comments of employees, if proven, was not extreme and outrageous); Farris v. 
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 924 F. Supp. 1041, 1051 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating that failure to 
investigate alleged harassment was not extreme even though employee had filed EEOC charges 
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News reports sometimes discuss incidents of harm to students studying abroad 
for which there are no reported decisions.28  Because of the tendency of tort cases 
to be settled, rather than fully tried, the number of unreported cases based on harm 
to students participating in study abroad programs may be considerably larger than 
what appears in legal research databases.29  Accidents, including many of a serious 
nature,30 are probably at least as likely to happen to Americans traveling in other 
countries as in the United States.31
and a complaint with the defendant employer). 
 28. See, e.g., Gary Rotstein, Arrest in Seoul Killing: Ex-Marshall Student Confesses to 
Derry Woman’s Beating, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 2, 2002, at A1 (discussing a student 
at the University of Pittsburgh who was found “naked and beaten to death in her room” while 
traveling on a break from studies at Kiemyung University in Korea). 
 29. Cf. Watson, supra note 1, at 7 (describing briefly four incidents). 
 30. Respondent’s Brief at 6, Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad Ltd., 13 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. B162753)  (describing a fall resulting in paralysis).  
 31. But see Watson, supra note 1, at 7 (stating that “[g]iven the numbers of students on 
American college campuses who die each year from noncriminal activity such as auto accidents, 
or who are assaulted or robbed on their home campus, it is arguable that students are statistically 
safer overseas than they are in the United States”).  It is difficult to prove whether or not accidents 
are more likely to occur in the United States or abroad.  American criminologists, for example, 
find it hard to “provide precise data on the number of American victimizations abroad.”  Daniel 
B. Kennedy & Jason R. Sakis, Tourist Industry Liability for Crimes Against International 
Travelers, 22 TRIAL LAW. 301, 302 (1999).  However, one might reason circumstantially.  Auto 
accidents are more common in many countries than they are in the United States.  According to 
the U.S. State Department, “[a]n estimated 1.17 million deaths occur each year worldwide due to 
road accidents.  The majority of these deaths, about 70 percent, occur in developing countries.”  
U.S. Dep’t of State, Road Safety Overseas, http://travel.state.gov/travel/tips/safety/safety_1179. 
html (last visited Apr. 25, 2006).  Some studies have ranked the United States among the ten 
safest countries for road travel.  See Victoria Griffith, The Road to Trouble, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 
1996, available at http://www.asirt.org/Publications/financialtimes.htm (discussing a study by the 
Association for Safe International Travel).  Also, safety may correlate with economic 
development and technology.  Some persons argue that “newer is generally safer than older in the 
modern technological world.”  HUBER, supra note 15, at 160.  One might therefore suggest that 
countries with access to the most modern technologies are safer than those that are less 
developed.  But other persons vigorously dispute the underlying proposition about the correlation 
between modern technology and safety.  As one author wrote: 
The industrial revolution brought with it an unprecedented holocaust of workplace 
injuries and accidents: severed limbs, scalded faces, mine caveins, brown lung disease, 
and so on.  In the twentieth century these workplace hazards have been supplemented 
by . . . exposure to hundreds of toxic chemicals . . . . Outside the workplace we face 
acid rain, the carnage of automobile accidents, the creeping poison of toxic dumps, and 
the unquantifiable peril of nuclear waste and nuclear accident. 
Mark M. Hager, Civil Compensation and Its Discontents: A Response to Huber, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
539, 543 (1990).  The fact that life expectancy is longer in the United States than in many other 
countries may also be some indication that life in the United States is safer.  See James W. Shaw, 
William C. Horrace & Ronald J. Vogel, The Determinants of Life Expectancy: An Analysis of the 
OECD Health Data, 74 S. ECON. J. 768 (Apr. 1, 2005) (discussing that the “general consensus is 
that population life expectancy (or mortality) is a function” of several variables, including safety). 
Presumably, the answer to whether life abroad is safer than life in the United States turns 
upon the type of harm at issue.  My personal opinion, based on six trips to China during the past 
decade, is that in China there is a reduced risk of criminal harm (perhaps as a result of traditional 
Chinese respect for foreign visitors) and a greatly enhanced risk of accidental harm (resulting 
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It is important to consider carefully the risks and limits of potential liability in 
international education programs.  Overstating the risk of being sued threatens to 
divert limited resources from the educational components of study abroad to an 
illusory quest for risk-free education.  However, understating the threat of liability 
not only makes it more likely that a program provider will be mired in claims for 
damages, it also squanders valuable opportunities for achieving an optimal level of 
safety in foreign educational ventures.32  “Resources are scarce, and so it would be 
wasteful either to devote too many of those resources to accident prevention or to 
devote too little to accident prevention.”33  Consequently, “[p]roper deterrence 
requires making those who contemplate dangerous conduct liable for all of the 
increased harm that occurs whenever that dangerous conduct is undertaken.  
Making actors liable for more than that over-deters.”34
In managing the risks associated with operation of an international education 
venture, it may be useful for program providers to distinguish between risks that 
are inherent in any study abroad program (e.g., risks relating to the condition of the 
program’s facilities) and special risks that are not a necessary part of study abroad 
(e.g., risks relating to non-educational activities, such as bungee jumping and other 
forms of recreation).  A program provider has no choice but to devote attention and 
resources to managing inherent risks.  Special risks that are not an integral part of 
the education program can be addressed by dropping those activities from the 
foreign program and neither sponsoring nor recommending them as outside 
activities. 
The objective of focusing on safety concerns related to study abroad is not to 
from all sorts of preventable dangers, such a multitudinous missing man-hole covers in major 
cities, unlighted stairways, and egregiously bad driving practices).  Such dangers of accidental 
harm give rise to substantial liability in the United States.  See $16M Award for Woman Injured 
in Manhole Fall, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 27, 2006, at 15.  Therefore, precautions often are taken in this 
country to avoid such dangers. 
Of course, it makes all the difference where one is traveling.  New Zealand is not the 
Balkans.  See John Henzell, New Zealand Voted Safest, Not Most Boring Travel Destination, 
PRESS (N.Z.), Feb. 23, 2005, at 13 (discussing a poll by Wanderlust, a British travel magazine).  
American students participating in a foreign educational program operated in Austria or Germany 
might legitimately feel an enhanced level of personal security (as a result of cultural norms and 
state-of-the-art technology).  In contrast, American students studying in Moldova or Mongolia 
may encounter many of the risks of accidental and intentional harm that are the natural 
byproducts of a weak economy.  Some of those injuries will inevitably result in tort litigation. 
 32. See Peter F. Lake, Private Law Continues to Come to Campus: Rights and 
Responsibilities Revisited, 31 J.C. & U.L. 621, 624 (2005) (stating that the “modern college or 
university now attends to foreseeable risks as a matter of good business, not just for litigation 
avoidance”). 
 33. VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 250 (3d ed. 
2005). 
 34. Id. at 433.  See also Johnson, supra note 15, at 1037 (“Over-deterrence occurs where the 
risk of tort liability prompts persons to spend resources on efforts designed solely to avoid 
liability (as may be the case where malpractice-wary physicians order unnecessary medical tests) 
or to abandon fields of endeavor entirely (as is true where doctors refuse to perform obstetric 
services and companies terminate contraceptive research).”); Dall, supra note 18, at 506 
(“Excessive imposition of liability not only creates a financial burden but may also cause rational 
college administrators to reduce programming and to interact differently with students.”). 
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offer a risk-free foreign experience.  That goal is no more desirable than the idea 
that car manufacturers should produce risk-free vehicles so crash-worthy and slow 
that no one could ever be harmed in an auto-accident and no suit ever filed.  
Education inevitably entails risks,35 particularly when it takes place in another 
country.  Exposing students to some of those risks is part of the educational 
process.  Allowing students to become immersed in a foreign culture, rather than 
sheltered within the confines of an Americanized foreign educational outpost, 
helps them to understand how other people live and why those people do what they 
do.36  Cultural immersion also helps students to see that the choices that define the 
fabric of foreign economic cultures and foreign legal systems produce different 
levels of affluence, citizen empowerment, and consumer protection.  Americans 
need to appreciate, both through experience and intellect, that only a fraction of the 
world enjoys the level of prosperity, political freedom, and general safety that now 
prevail in the United States. 
American program providers should not operate super-cautious foreign 
programs,37 excessively concerned with imposing American practices on life in 
foreign cultures.  “The key objective [of travel] is to experience events, lifestyles, 
attitudes, cultures, political outlooks, and theological views utterly different from 
what you encounter at home.”38  Thus, American program providers should not 
strive to make a foreign educational experience the same as studying in the United 
States, but should simply take reasonable precautions to minimize the foreseeable 
risks of harm to program participants.  One way of doing this is by providing 
accurate information to students and their families that allow them to make an 
informed choice about whether a program entails an acceptable level of risk.  
Another way of promoting safety is to implement programmatic practices that 
minimize the probability of unnecessary harm.  Yet it is important to remember 
that “some measures to reduce the costs of accidents are not worth taking, because 
 35. See Nancy Tribbensee, Tort Litigation in Higher Educations: A Review of Cases 
Decided in the Year 2001, 29 J.C. & U.L. 249, 284 (2003) (stating that “[s]ome level of risk is 
inherent in teaching, learning, and managing the daily operations of a college or university,” but 
that many tort claims can be avoided). 
 36. See FROMMER, supra note 7, at xiv (“To have meaning at all, travel must . . . challenge 
our preconceptions and most cherished views, cause us to rethink our assumptions, shake us a bit, 
make us broader-minded and more understanding.”). 
 37. However, some persons advocate what others might think of as unusual or extraordinary 
steps to plan ahead for contingencies.  For example, in his article regarding crisis management for 
international study, John E. Watson states “[i]t is highly recommended that consideration be 
given to procuring kidnap and ransom coverage, which is designed to fund not only the economic 
demands of the perpetrators but to provide the institution direct access to specialists in hostage 
negotiation and recovery. . . . [O]n-site assessments of [foreign facilities] present the opportunity 
to discover unique hazards that might otherwise go unrecognized . . . including lack of local fire 
hydrants, . . . lack of safety glass in doors, . . . [and] uneven pavement.”  Watson, supra note 1, at 
9.  Watson further states that it is useful to develop personal contacts with “key representatives 
from the local police and fire agencies.”  Id. at 10.   
 38. Jonathan T. Weisberg, Arthur Frommer: The Traveler at Home, YALE L. REP. Summer 
2005, at 47 (quoting Arthur Frommer, the Yale lawyer and entrepreneur who wrote EUROPE ON 5 
DOLLARS A DAY (1957) and other books that, beginning in the 1950s, revolutionized foreign 
travel for Americans). 
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the benefits of added safety would amount to less than the costs.”39
The liability issues relevant to study abroad programs are as broad as the 
expansive field of torts.  To some extent, the claims that will arise in the 
international education context may be similar to suits involving home campus 
activities that raise issues relating to premises liability,40 intentional or negligent 
infliction of emotional distress,41 negligent misrepresentation,42 fraud,43 and 
negligent security.44  However, some causes of action related to the unique nature 
of study abroad may have no precise home campus counterparts, such as suits 
concerned with the duties owed to students when civil unrest or political violence 
wracks the host country, when gunmen ambush a bus,45 or when dangers arise 
 39. JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 251.  See also id. at 250 (stating, with respect to 
the Learned Hand negligence formula, that “this is why the law insists that drivers keep to the 
right on two-way streets, while not bothering to make pedestrians on sidewalks stay in lanes”). 
 40. See Cohen v. Univ. of Dayton, 840 N.E.2d 1144, 1146 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (alleging 
that a university negligently caused the death of one student who died as a result of arson 
committed by a second student in a university residence); Manon v. Univ. of Toledo, No. 2003-
09840, 2005 WL 1532916, at *1–2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. June 21, 2005) (holding that a student failed to 
prove that a university negligently caused a slip-and-fall accident); Candido v. Univ. of R.I., 880 
A.2d 853, 857–60 (R.I. 2005) (holding that a university was not liable for negligence where 
evidence established that the dark area where the plaintiff student fell was not an existing 
pathway and that student could have used existing pathways rather than his chosen route); Webb 
v. Univ. of Utah, 125 P.3d 906, 912–13 (Utah 2005) (holding that a state university instructor’s 
directive to students during a field trip to traverse icy sidewalks did not reasonably induce 
students to rely on the directive such that a student could prevail on a negligence claim against the 
university for injuries suffered when another person grabbed the student while slipping on the 
sidewalk). 
 41. See Turner v. Univ. of S.F. Sch. of Nursing, No. C 05-02048 JSW, 2005 WL 3097874, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2005) (dismissing claims by a student with learning disabilities for 
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, but allowing the student to re-plead); 
Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. Supp. 2d 6, 46–47 (D. Me. 2005) (holding that a university’s 
finding that two students had committed sexual assault did not constitute intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, absent a showing that the finding was intentionally false); Shelton v. Trs. of 
Columbia Univ., No. 04 Civ. 6714(AKH), 2005 WL 2898237, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2005) 
(holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on expulsion was time 
barred). 
 42. See Gomes, 365 F. Supp. 2d at 47–48 (holding that any failure of a university 
disciplinary committee’s presiding officer to forward allegedly promised information to the 
committee did not amount to negligent misrepresentation, absent evidence of justifiable reliance 
by the plaintiff students). 
 43. See Harmon v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 03-738-C, 2005 WL 1353752, at 
*3–6 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2005) (holding that a student presented sufficient evidence to support 
claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation relating to accreditation of the school); Shelton, 
2005 WL 2898237, at *5 (holding that plaintiff failed to prove fraud based on presentation of 
allegedly false information at plagiarism hearing). 
 44. See Shivers v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 2000-02461, 2005 WL 517450, at *4 (Ohio Ct. 
Cl. Jan. 6, 2005) (holding that a university’s failure to install locks or latches on shower doors 
constituted a breach of duty of care that caused the student’s injuries); Kleisch v. Cleveland State 
Univ., No. 2003-08452, 2005 WL 663214, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 22, 2005) (holding that a 
university was not liable for the unforeseeable rape of a student in a classroom). 
 45. See Hoye, supra note 20, at 10 (discussing an ambush in Guatemala in 1998); id. at 11 
(discussing an ambush in Ecuador in 1997). 
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from educational contact with a controversial foreign scholar.46
This article will address selected topics relating to the demands that American 
tort law places on the operation of study abroad programs.  However, the 
discussion will commence by considering three issues which may limit the role 
that American law or American courts play in resolving tort claims arising in 
connection with international educational programs, namely the efficacy of 
contractual provisions specifying choice of law (Part II), choice of arbitration (Part 
III), or choice of forum (Part IV).  These important, but heretofore little discussed, 
matters may play pivotal roles in determining issues of tort liability.   
The remaining sections focus on the principles of American tort law that will 
guide the resolution of claims that are resolved by reference to the law of an 
American state (as opposed to the law of another country).  Part V discusses the 
principal theories under which a program provider may be subject to liability 
(fault, respondeat superior, nondelegable duty, and ostensible agency).  Part VI 
then focuses on negligence claims, exploring in turn the relationship between 
reasonable care and foreseeability; the contextual nature of reasonable care; the 
significance of conformance with or departure from customary practices; and 
liability based on voluntary assumption of a duty that would not otherwise exist.  
Next, Part VII considers legal responsibility for misrepresentations made in 
relation to foreign educational programs and breach of fiduciary duty.  Part VIII, 
the conclusion, emphasizes the importance of sound personnel decisions and 
returns the discussion to its starting point, the need to keep the risk of tort liability 
in perspective. 
II. CHOICE OF LAW 
The mere fact that an injury occurs outside the United States does not mean that 
an American court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim based on the injury.47  
 46. “Intellectuals and academics whose work threatens established orthodoxy have been 
persecuted in every age.”  Inst. of Int’l Educ., Saving Lives and Ideas: A Brief History of Scholar 
Rescue, Jan. 2006,  http://www.iie.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Programs7/SRF/Saving_Lives 
_and_Ideas.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2006) (discussing the scholar rescue program of the Institute 
of International Education).   
 47. See Arno v. Club Med Inc., 22 F.3d 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (adjudicating tort and contract 
claims arising from a rape at a resort in France); McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412 
(9th Cir. 1989) (adjudicating tort and contract claims arising from events that took place in Saudi 
Arabia); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that “[c]ommon law 
courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transitory tort claims between individuals over 
whom they exercise personal jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 (1965) (providing that “[a] state has 
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside 
its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if either (a) the conduct and its effect are 
generally recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have 
reasonably developed legal systems, or (b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of 
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as 
a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not 
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably 
developed legal systems”). 
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The usual rules of jurisdiction will apply.  A program provider, such as a college or 
university, may be sued in the state in which it is located, in another state where it 
has “minimum contacts,”48 or in federal court subject to the rules of personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction.49
The principles of tort law applicable to a suit involving an injury occurring 
outside the United States will ordinarily be determined under choice-of-law 
rules.50  For example, if a student from state A sues a program provider from state 
B for harm suffered in connection with a program conducted in foreign country C, 
a court will apply choice-of-law rules to decide whether the tort law of jurisdiction 
A, B, or C, or perhaps even some other jurisdiction, governs the dispute.51  The 
applicable tests for determining choice of law are stated at a high level of 
generality due to “the great variety of torts . . . and . . . [the] fluidity of the 
decisions and scholarly writings on choice of law in torts.”52  As a result, it is 
difficult to predict which body of law will apply to a foreign educational program 
tort claim.   
Indeed, the uncertainty is even greater than might first appear.  An accident in a 
study abroad program might affect multiple participants drawn from different parts 
of the United States or from different countries, and therefore there may be diverse 
competing interests relevant to the claims of the various injured parties.  Moreover, 
courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all issues 
under the local law of a single state. . . . Each issue is to receive separate 
consideration if it is one which would be resolved differently under the 
 48. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (“[D]ue process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within 
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 
the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”); see also 
Antoine v. Syracuse Univ., No. CV030473601, 2003 WL 22481407, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 
20, 2003) (dismissing because of the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state 
university); Severinsen v. Widener Univ., 768 A.2d 200, 206 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(holding that an out-of-state university’s recruitment activities in New Jersey were not so 
systematic, pervasive, and continuous as to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction for 
purposes of a negligence action brought by a student who was injured in a university dormitory). 
 49. See Vilchis v. Miami Univ. of Ohio, 99 F. App’x 743, 745–46 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that a university was not subject to jurisdiction in Illinois, even though a coach recruited the 
plaintiff diver while she lived in Illinois and the swim team traveled to Illinois once, because the 
university was located in Ohio, the diving team practiced on campus and had a majority of its 
meets in Ohio, and the injury occurred in Ohio).  “Where the jurisdiction of a federal court is 
premised on diversity, the court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant only if a state court 
where the district court sits would have personal jurisdiction.”  Id. at 745 (citing Hyatt Int’l Corp. 
v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 713 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
 50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145(1) (1971) (stating that “[t]he 
rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law 
of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
occurrence”). 
 51. Cf. Arno, 22 F.3d at 1467 (applying choice-of-law rules and determining that French 
law governed tort claims arising from a rape at a resort in France); McGhee, 871 F.2d at 1422 
(holding that Saudi law governed claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, fraud, and conversion arising from events that took place in Saudi Arabia). 
 52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 145 cmt. a (1971). 
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local law rule of two or more of the potentially interested states.53
A program provider may seek to reduce uncertainties relating to applicable legal 
principles by specifying in its agreement with program participants that claims will 
be governed by the law of a particular state.  Many colleges and universities 
already do this.  “[P]arties may generally consent to application of American law 
to govern their relations, as evidenced by a choice of law clause.”54  “[R]easonable 
stipulations of choice of law are honored in contract cases.”55  In addition, courts 
have found that there is no reason why the same principles of deference to party 
choice should not apply to tort claims,56 at least if the choice-of-law clause 
“embraces all aspects of the legal relationship.”57
 53. Id. § 145 cmt. d. 
 54. Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 185 (3d Cir. 1995).  See also 
Holloway v. HECI Exploration Co. Employee’s Profit Sharing Plan, 76 B.R. 563, 572  (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1987) (stating in dicta that “parties can, within broad limits, stipulate the substantive 
law to be applied to their dispute”); Muslin v. Freylinghuysen Livestock Managers, Inc., 777 F.2d 
1230, 1231 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the parties could stipulate to New York law); Casio, 
Inc. v. S.M. & R. Co., Inc., 755 F.2d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that “[p]arties can within 
broad limits stipulate the substantive law to be applied to their dispute”). 
 55. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, 
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 355–56 (2d ed. 1980)).  See also Von Hundertmark 
v. Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., No. CV-93-1369 (CPS), 1996 WL 118538, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 7, 1996) (stating, with respect to a contractual choice-of-law provision, that under New 
York law, which provides by statute that “parties may contract, agree, or undertake in advance to 
apply a certain forum’s law . . . there is no express prohibition against parties stipulating as to the 
choice of law in tort actions”).  But see Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 
492 n.2 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Louisiana does allow parties to agree contractually to what state’s law 
would be applied to resolution of contractual disputes.”); Swanson v. Image Bank, Inc., 77 P.3d 
439, 441–42 (Ariz. 2003) (stating that “neither a statute nor a rule of law permitting parties to 
choose the applicable law confers unfettered freedom to contract at will on this point,” and that 
when the parties include an express choice of law provision, the court must conduct an “analysis 
to ascertain the appropriate balance between the parties’ circumstances and the states’ interests” 
and thereby determine if the provision is valid and effective). 
 56. See Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 495 (“[W]e do not see why the same principle should not apply 
in tort cases, though the issue has not to our knowledge arisen in such a case.”).  As described in 
Twohy v. First National Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985): 
Lloyd considered whether the Wisconsin courts would recognize a tort of wrongful 
interference with a child’s custody . . . . Both parties had stipulated in the district court 
below that the law of Wisconsin applied to the substantive issues of the case.  
Plaintiffs, however, urged on appeal that under Wisconsin conflict of laws principles, 
the law of Maryland should control the “wrongful interference” issue.   
Id. at 1190 (citations omitted).  Twohy found that reasonable stipulations of litigants as to choice 
of law in tort cases would be honored by Illinois law.  Id. at 1191. 
 57. Jiffy Lube Int’l, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube of Pa., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(stating that “[c]ontractual choice of law provisions . . . do not govern tort claims between 
contracting parties unless the fair import of the provision embraces all aspects of the legal 
relationship,” and declining to find that a narrow provision “limited on its face to ‘this 
agreement’” determined the choice of law for tort claims involving fraud and misrepresentation).  
See also Turtur v. Rothschild Registry Int’l, Inc., 26 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that a 
contractual choice-of-law provision covering “any controversy or claim arising out of or relating 
to this contract or breach thereof” was sufficiently broad to encompass a claim for common law 
fraud); Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719, 726 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding 
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A judicious choice-of-law provision may confer substantial advantages on a 
program provider.  Today, in the United States, tort principles and judicial attitudes 
are considerably more favorable to plaintiffs in some states than in others.  
Suppose, for example, that New Mexico tort law tends to be pro-plaintiff58 and 
that Texas tort law tends to be pro-defendant.59  A Texas college or university that 
operates a foreign program which attracts students from New Mexico might 
benefit from stating, as part of the student-provider contract, that Texas law 
governs disputes arising in connection with the program.60  A court may rely on 
that claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation were not governed by the parties’ narrow 
choice-of-law provision); Dorsey v. N. Life Ins. Co., No. Civ.A. 04-0342, 2005 WL 2036738, at 
*6 (E.D. La. Aug. 15, 2005) (stating that in the Fifth Circuit narrowly worded “choice of law 
clauses . . . apply only to contract claims and not to tort claims arising out of the contractual 
relationship”); Turtur v. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. John Brown, No. 94 C 4424, 1994 WL 535108, 
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1994) (declining to apply a choice-of-law clause to tort claims because 
“[a]lthough the choice-of-law clause specifies that the contract’s terms are to be interpreted and 
enforced in accordance with California law, neither the choice-of-law clause nor any other 
language in the contract suggests that the parties also intended tort or other non-contractual 
claims to be governed by California law”). 
 58. See, e.g., Lozoya v. Sanchez, 66 P.3d 948, 954 (N.M. 2003) (holding that although “no 
other State in the union currently allows unmarried cohabitants to recover for loss of consortium,” 
such a claim may be asserted in New Mexico by an unmarried cohabitant who proves an intimate 
familial relationship with the victim). 
 59. For example, “[v]irtually all courts confronting the issue have decided that mental-
health professionals owe some affirmative duty to third parties with regard to patients who are 
recognized as posing dangers.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL 
HARM § 41 cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  However, Texas is to the contrary.  See 
Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635 (Tex. 1999) (holding that a psychiatrist has no duty to warn a 
victim or the victim’s family).  As to the conservatism of Texas tort law, see generally Patricia F. 
Miller, Comment, 2003 Texas House Bill 4: Unanimous Exemplary Damage Awards and Texas 
Civil Jury Instructions, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 515, 518–19 (2006) (discussing comprehensive tort 
reform legislation which was criticized for “reduc[ing] damage awards and severely restrict[ing] 
certain causes of action” and will potentially create great obstacles for plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages); Phil Hardberger, Juries Under Seige, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 4 (1998) (describing 
decisions of the conservative Texas Supreme Court during the 1990s); Timothy D. Howell, So 
Long “Sweetheart”—State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy Swings the Pendulum Further to 
the Right as the Latest in a Line of Setbacks for Texas Plaintiffs, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 52 
(1997) (“[N]owhere has [the] modern retreat from a pro-plaintiff atmosphere been more apparent 
than in Texas.”). 
 60. Anyone who doubts that specifying Texas law would confer a benefit on a defendant 
may want to survey Texas tort law.  Among other things, Texas has largely abolished claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Charles E. Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent 
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Texas: Stop Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 
465 (2002) (discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s retreat from a broad interpretation of the tort), 
declines to award loss of consortium damages in cases of injury to a child, Roberts v. Williamson, 
111 S.W.3d 113, 117 (Tex. 2003), rejects social host liability for providers of alcohol, Beard v. 
Graff, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993), broadly construes the no-duty rules relating to obvious 
dangers, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. 2003), narrowly applies the 
doctrine of constructive notice, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. 2002), 
restricts application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, Trans Am. Holding v. Market-Antiques, 39 
S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App. 2000), and follows the traditional rules on premises liability rather than 
modern standards that broaden the duties of possessors of land, Wong v. Tenet Hosps., Ltd., 181 
S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App. 2005). 
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that language in resolving choice-of-law issues, as it is customary for the judiciary 
to defer to decisions made by the parties regarding applicable law, assuming the 
choice-of-law clause is reasonable.61  Presumably, the parties must specify the law 
of a state to which the program provider, the student, or the program has a clear 
relationship.62  In the context of contractual choice-of-law provisions, “[o]rdinarily 
the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of 
the making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs.”63  Courts 
sometimes question the validity of boilerplate choice-of-law provisions which have 
not been specifically bargained for by the parties.64  However, reasonable 
provisions that are part of standard form contracts have often been enforced.65
If there are several reasonable choices that might be made in specifying which 
 61. See Rexford Rand Corp. v. Ancel, 58 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 n.6 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating 
that “‘[l]itigants can, by stipulation, formal or informal, agree on the substantive law to be applied 
to their case,’ as long as the stipulation is reasonable” (citing City of Clinton v. Moffitt, 812 F.2d 
341, 341 (7th Cir. 1987))).  In City of Clinton, the court found that “the parties agree that Illinois 
contract law governs, and that is all that is necessary to make it govern.”  City of Clinton, 812 
F.2d at 342.  Cf. In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill. 1990) (holding that a 
stipulation, applying Illinois law, entered into after litigation had commenced, would not be 
enforced because it was “unreasonable”).  The Adams court stated:  
we decline to accept the parties’ stipulation that Illinois law should govern . . . . We do 
not believe that we should allow the minor to forgo what benefits may exist for him 
under the Florida statute and to stipulate instead to the application of what is perhaps 
the more stringent provision.   
Id. at 639.  Of course, the validity of a choice-of-law agreement antedating litigation may be 
subject to a different analysis. 
 62. See Von Hundertmark v. Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n, Inc., No. CV-93-1369 (CPS), 
1996 WL 118538, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1996) (recognizing that there is no prohibition under 
New York law to party stipulation of choice of law in tort actions and that “choice of law clauses 
are routinely enforced so long as there is a reasonable basis for the choice or the state whose law 
is selected has sufficient contacts with the transaction”).  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONFLICTS § 187(2) (1971) (“The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their 
contractual rights and duties will be applied . . . unless . . . (a) the chosen state has no substantial 
relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ 
choice.”); Thomas P. Hanley, Enforcing Governing Law Clauses in Contracts, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18, 
2001, at 1 (stating that despite a New York statute governing certain large transactions, which 
provides that “the parties’ governing law clause must be enforced, regardless whether the 
underlying transaction bears a reasonable relationship to New York State . . . several federal 
courts have persisted in requiring a sufficient connection between the agreement at issue and this 
state before upholding a contractual stipulation of New York law”); Michael A. Rosenhouse, 
Annotation, Validity and Effect of Stipulation in Contract to Effect That It Shall Be Governed by 
Law of Particular State Which Is Neither Place Where Contract Is Made Nor Place Where It Is to 
Be Performed, 16 A.L.R.4th 967 (2005) (stating that enforcement is rarely allowed). 
 63. Churchill Corp. v. Third Century, Inc., 578 A.2d 532, 537 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating 
that “Pennsylvania courts will uphold choice-of-law provisions in contracts to the extent that the 
transaction bears a reasonable relation to the chosen forum”). 
 64. Id. (stating, in a dispute arising from a lease of office equipment, that it was unclear 
whether a choice-of-law provision that was not bargained-over was valid, but that it was 
unnecessary to resolve that issue because the parties agreed as to which state’s law applied). 
 65. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 54 (1995) (enforcing 
a choice-of-law provision in a standard form contract); Volt Info.Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989) (upholding a “standard” choice-of-law provision).  
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state’s tort law is applicable to a dispute between a foreign program participant and 
a program provider, then the most important consideration may be the states’ 
respective positions on the validity of written releases limiting liability for 
negligence or continued adherence to charitable immunity.  States differ widely in 
their willingness to enforce written releases.66  The law of some jurisdictions will 
be more favorable to defendant program providers than others.  So too, while 
charitable immunity has been abolished or severely limited in several states, it 
retains continued vitality in other states.67  In one recent case, a student, who was 
domiciled in Connecticut, brought an action against a university located in New 
Jersey for personal injuries sustained in New York during a university club rugby 
event.68  The Second Circuit held that the university’s motion to dismiss was 
properly granted because New Jersey’s charitable immunity law applied to the 
dispute.69
A somewhat different question is whether the contract between a program 
provider and a participant could (or should) say that a tort suit will be governed by 
the law of the country that is the host site for the foreign program.  In some cases, 
such a choice might be reasonable.  European countries, for example, have tort 
regimes that are in many respects similar to American law.70  A student 
 66. See Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, Releases: Is There Still a Place for 
Their Use by Colleges and Universities?, 29 J.C. & U.L. 579, 617 (2003) (stating that “[s]ome 
courts emphasize the public interest in holding releases invalid when the service or activity is 
essential and cannot be obtained elsewhere, while others focus on the bargaining power of the 
respective parties.  Some courts enforce releases containing broad, general language; others do 
not.  Some courts require that the word ‘negligence’ be used to release a party from its own 
negligence; others do not.  Some demand evidence that the release was ‘negotiated’ and 
‘bargained for,’ while other courts place no emphasis on this requirement.  Most courts uphold 
clearly expressed releases in situations where the activity at question is voluntary, but not all do 
so”).  See also Respondent’s Brief at 6, Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes Abroad 
Ltd., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. B162753) (describing a broadly-worded release); 
Gonzalez v. Univ. Sys. of N.H., 38 Conn. L. Rptr. 673 (Super. Ct. 2005) (holding release invalid 
in suit involving a cheerleading accident); Lemoine v. Cornell Univ., 769 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315–16 
(App. Div. 2003) (holding that a release barred university liability for injuries a student sustained 
in a climbing wall accident); Wheeler v. Owens Cmty. Coll., No. 2003-07855, 2005 WL 106781, 
at *5 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Jan. 11, 2005) (holding that “language of the release was too general to be 
enforceable because it purport[ed] to release [the] defendant from any type of misconduct, 
whether it be negligent, wanton or willful misconduct”); Fay v. Thiel Coll., 55 Pa. D. & C.4th 
353, 360 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001) (holding that an exculpatory clause contained in the waiver of 
liability form signed by the student who participated in a study abroad program in Peru was an 
invalid contract of adhesion because the “form was presented to plaintiff on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis”). 
 67. See generally JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 33, at 853–59 (discussing abrogation and 
restoration of charitable immunity). 
 68. Gilbert v. Seton Hall Univ., 332 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 69. Id.  
 70. See EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW (2005), 
available at www.egtl.org.  See generally Bernhard A. Koch, The “European Group on Tort 
Law” and Its “Principles of European Tort Law,” 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 191 (2005) (stating 
that the Principles “present a common framework both for the further development of national 
laws and for uniform European legislation”).  In Europe, tort damages awards are often 
considerably less than in the United States.  See Anita Bernstein, Muss Es Sein? Not Necessarily, 
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participating in a summer program in Austria is subject to the criminal laws of that 
country.71  Why would it be unfair to say that the student’s rights to recover for 
personal injury or property damage occurring in Austria will be determined under 
Austrian tort law?  In commercial contexts, courts have upheld choice-of-law 
provisions selecting the law of a foreign country with a clear relationship to the 
contract.72  A court might well defer to a choice of the law of an international 
education program’s host country if the choice offers viable tort remedies.73  Dicta 
in federal court cases has said that the parties cannot agree that their disputes will 
be governed by “the Code of Hammurabi” because that ancient code is nowhere in 
force.74  However, if the parties agree that a dispute shall be governed by a living, 
current body of law, judicial deference to that choice may follow.  As the Seventh 
Circuit has recognized, while a “court has an interest . . . in applying a body of law 
that is in force somewhere, [it has] less interest in which such body of law to 
apply.”75
Some countries, such as China, have nothing even roughly equivalent to 
American tort law.76  Therefore, a provision in an educational program contract, 
Says Tort Law, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 22 n.55 (2004) (stating that “in Europe, Canada, 
Japan, and Australia . . . plaintiffs are awarded much lower judgments”).  Also, in Europe, 
contingent fees are generally not permitted, so plaintiffs have greater difficulty gaining access to 
the courts.  Virginia G. Mauer, Robert E. Thomas & Pamela A. DeBooth, Attorney Fee 
Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 272, 320 
(1999) (“The percentage contingency fee is not permitted in most of the continental legal 
systems.”).  However, these impediments to recovery would presumably not apply if an American 
court and jury were applying European tort law principles. 
 71. U.S. Dep’t. of State, Consular Information Sheet: Austria, http://travel.state.gov/travel/ 
cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_965.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2006) (stating that “[p]ersons violating Austrian 
laws, even unknowingly, may be expelled, arrested or imprisoned”). 
 72. Cf. Twohy v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 758 F.2d 1185, 1191 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(enforcing a stipulation of Spanish law in a suit involving tort claims for fraud, misrepresentation, 
and libel because the law of Spain bore a “significant relationship to or [had] significant contacts 
with the parties and alleged transaction and injury in this suit.”  Furthermore, “[t]he relationship 
of the parties was centered in Spain, the alleged injury occurred in Spain, and the alleged loan 
agreement was both negotiated in Spain and intended to be performed in Spain”); El Pollo Loco, 
S.A. de C.V. v. El Pollo Loco, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 986, 988 (S.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that a 
provision designating Mexican law as governing “[a]ll disputes which may arise in connection 
with the performance of this Agreement” was sufficiently broad to require application of Mexican 
law to tort claims). 
 73. New Zealand does not have a conventional tort system.  An accident compensation 
scheme substitutes for tort remedies.  See Stephen Todd, Privatization of Accident Compensation: 
Policy and Politics in New Zealand, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 404, 495 (2000).  “Visitors, like 
everyone else, can make a claim,” but entitlements are limited.  Id. at 444. 
 74. See Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495  (7th Cir. 1982) (“If the parties had stipulated 
that the substantive law to be applied was the Code of Hammurabi, we think the district court 
should have said that it did not have the power to render a decision on that basis.  Such a decision 
could not have any value as precedent, and the production of precedents is a major function of 
judicial decision-making.”); see also Twohy, 758 F.2d at 1191 (stating that “a court . . . would 
lack power to render a decision based on the Code of Hammurabi” because that would “call into 
question the court’s subject matter jurisdiction”). 
 75. See Lloyd, 694 F.2d at 495. 
 76. See Vincent R. Johnson & Brian T. Bagley, Fighting Epidemics with Information and 
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stating that Chinese law will govern compensation for injuries to a student injured 
while participating in a program in China, would effectively deny the participant 
any viable remedy.  It is doubtful that an American court would defer to such a 
choice.77  Contractual choice-of-law provisions are ineffective when adherence to 
the parties’ selected law would frustrate public policy.78  Relegating a student to 
recovery under principles of law of a country which offers no realistic chance for 
adequate compensation would surely violate American public policy. 
While minimizing uncertainty about applicable law is a desirable goal, great 
care should be exercised before specifying in the program provider-participant 
contract that disputes are to be governed by the law of another country.  First, 
American courts typically have little expertise in applying foreign law.  The skills 
of American judges educated in the common-law tradition may be insufficient for 
accurately interpreting and applying, for example, the German Civil Code.79  To 
that extent, the court may be unwilling to defer to the parties’ choice-of-law (since 
it burdens the limited resources of the court), may apply the foreign law 
erroneously (which may generate appeals), or may insist on greater briefing by the 
parties (which will entail delay and expense).  Second, before specifying foreign 
law as the applicable regime, a program provider would need to consult an expert 
Laws: The Case of SARS in China, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 157, 173 (2005) (discussing the 
undeveloped state of tort law in China and indicating that before the recent rise of a market 
economy and the decline of the old-style communism “there was traditionally little need [in 
China] for a tort system and little tort litigation”); William P. Alford & Yuanyuan Shen, The 
Limits of Law in Addressing China’s Environmental Dilemma, 16 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 147 
(1997) (indicating that “the Chinese system defines very narrowly the range of activities 
actionable under tort law”).  See also Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 603, 617 (2003) (noting on-going efforts to draft China’s first tort 
law). 
 77. Cf. Cent. Soya Co., Inc. v. Epstein Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(“The parties and the district court have treated this as a case governed by general common law, 
much as if Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), had never 
been decided.  We do not think we could be required by a stipulation of the parties to decide a 
case according to a body of law that is nowhere in force, and that is what we would be doing if 
we tried to decide this case under general common law.”).   
 78. See Keller v. Brunswick Corp., 369 N.E.2d 327, 329 (Ill. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that 
“[w]hile the parties may have intended to make a limited choice of Wisconsin law in this case, 
i.e., a choice of the Wisconsin law necessary to interpret only the ambiguous terms of their 
agreement, we cannot allow such an agreement to violate the clear requirements of the Wisconsin 
Fair Dealership Law which was in effect when the parties entered their contract”).  See also 
Fulcrum Fin. Partners v. Meridian Leasing Corp., 230 F.3d 1004, 1011 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating 
that in contract cases, “Illinois respects the contract’s choice-of-law clause as long as the contract 
is valid and the law chosen is not contrary to Illinois’s fundamental public policy”).  See 
generally 12 ILL. LAW AND PRACTICE: CONTRACTS § 163 (2006) (“The power by which courts 
may declare a contract void as against public policy is far-reaching . . . [but courts] should not 
hold contracts void as against public policy unless they are clearly and unmistakably so.  In order 
that a contract may be declared void as being against public policy, the line of that policy must be 
clear and distinct, and, in the absence of express legislative or constitutional prohibition, the court 
must find that the contract is injurious in some way to the interests of society.”).   
 79. Cf. Ezell v. Hayes Oilfield Constr. Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(discussing, in a conflict-of-law context, the “great difficulty for federal judges unaccustomed to 
treading the narrow path of the civil law”). 
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about whether foreign law protects the interests of the program provider more 
effectively than American law.  That consultation process could itself be slow, 
time-consuming, and costly.  In short, a contractual choice-of-law provision that 
specifies foreign law as the source of tort principles (in contrast to a clause that 
specifies the law of an American state) might well add unnecessary layers of 
uncertainty and difficulty to the task of minimizing tort liability related to an 
international education program. 
III. CHOICE OF ARBITRATION 
An agreement between a program provider and participants might also provide 
for arbitration of disputes,80 and that provision may explicitly81 or implicitly 
encompass arbitration of tort claims arising in connection with the program.  
However, whether an arbitration clause will confer an advantage on a program 
provider defending against a tort claim is a matter of both construction of the 
provision and dispute-resolution perspective.82
First, while broadly-worded arbitration provisions83 are often held to include 
resolution of tort claims,84 some courts hold that only if a tort claim arises out of 
 80. Public policy favors arbitration in cases where the parties have clearly indicated 
willingness to arbitrate.  However, “[a]rbitration clauses must be clear and unequivocal” and 
“[g]enuine issues of fact will preclude an order to arbitrate.”  Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. 
Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440, 446 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 81. Contract language may expressly state that an agreement to arbitrate encompasses tort 
claims.  See Drafting Dispute Resolution Clauses—A Practical Guide, 605 PLI/LIT 23, 44 (1999) 
(suggesting that a financial institution might use language specifying that “[a]ny controversy or 
claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement . . . including but not limited to a claim based on 
or arising from an alleged tort, shall at the request of any party be determined by arbitration”); 
Terry L. Trantina, An Attorney’s Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution ADR: “ADR 1.01,” 
1102 PLI/CORP 29, 281 (1999) (containing language “providing for alternative dispute resolution 
of any and all disputes, controversies or claims, . . . whether based on contract, tort, statute, fraud, 
misrepresentation or any other legal or equitable theory, arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement”). 
 82. See also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 321 (2001) (“It 
is common for disputes to arise in international arbitration over the arbitrability of common law 
tort claims.”). 
 83. See Oliver Dillenz, Drafting International Commercial Arbitration Clauses, 21 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 221, 227 (1998) (opining that a “broad clause should contain 
three key expressions: ‘all disputes,’ ‘in connection with,’ and ‘finally settled’”).  
 84. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967) 
(holding that an arbitration clause required that a fraud claim that was related generally to the 
contract had to be arbitrated because the alleged fraud did not relate specifically to the arbitration 
provision itself); Pierson v. Dean Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that claims of fraud under a contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and gross 
negligence were not immune from arbitration under a broadly-worded and valid arbitration 
clause); Bos Material Handling, Inc. v. Crown Controls Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 740, 745 (Ct. App. 
1983) (stating that “where contracts provide arbitration for ‘any controversy . . . arising out of or 
relating to the contract,’”  arbitration is required as long as the tort claims “have their roots in the 
relationship between the parties which was created by the contract”); Gratech Co., Ltd. v. Wold 
Eng’g, P.C., 672 N.W.2d 672, 678 (N.D. 2003) (requiring arbitration of tort claims); Valero 
Energy Corp. v. Wagner & Brown, II, 777 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. App. 1989) (“[W]hen the 
VINCENT JOHNSON 8/28/2006  6:16:12 PM 
2006] AMERICANS ABROAD 327 
 
the contract itself, or its resolution necessitates reference to the contract, must the 
claim be arbitrated.85  Thus, courts have sometimes said that:  
If a tort claim is so interwoven with the contract that it cannot stand 
alone, it falls within the scope of an agreement to arbitrate; if, on the 
other hand, a tort claim is completely independent of the contract and 
could be maintained without reference to the contract, it falls outside the 
scope of an agreement to arbitrate.86  
The mere fact that the tort claim involves parties who entered into a contract 
containing an arbitration clause, will not, in some states, take a tort claim out of 
court.87  If an arbitration clause does encompass a tort claim, there will be a 
parties have agreed to arbitrate any dispute or disagreement ‘arising under the contract,’ all 
disputes of whatever nature, including those sounding in tort, that are directly and closely related 
to the performance of the contract and are otherwise arbitrable, are subject to arbitration upon the 
demand of a party to the agreement.”).  See generally Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: 
Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB. L. REV. 905, 932 (1996). 
 85. See Dusold v. Porta-John Corp., 807 P.2d 526 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the 
arbitration clause in a licensing agreement did not apply to personal injury tort claims associated 
with the licensee’s exposure to chemicals supplied by the licensor because the suit did not 
contend that the duty to warn the licensee of the toxic nature of the chemicals arose out of any 
contractual obligation that required reference to the contract to resolve the dispute); Seifert v. 
U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999) (stating that “the determination of whether a 
particular claim must be submitted to arbitration necessarily depends on the existence of some 
nexus between the dispute and the contract containing the arbitration clause” and holding that a 
tort claim against a home builder for carbon monoxide poisoning, based on the design of a 
garage, was not subject to arbitration).  In Seifert, the court reasoned:   
If the contract places the parties in a unique relationship that creates new duties not 
otherwise imposed by law, then a dispute regarding a breach of a contractually-
imposed duty is one that arises from the contract.  Analogously, such a claim would be 
one arising from the contract terms and therefore subject to arbitration where the 
contract required it.  If, on the other hand, the duty alleged to be breached is one 
imposed by law in recognition of public policy and is generally owed to others besides 
the contracting parties, then a dispute regarding such a breach is not one arising from 
the contract, but sounds in tort.  Therefore, a contractually-imposed arbitration 
requirement . . . would not apply to such a claim.   
Id. at 639 (quoting Dusold, 807 P.2d at 529–31) (citations omitted). 
 86. Assoc. Glass, Ltd. v. Eye Ten Oaks Inv., Ltd., 147 S.W.3d 507, 513 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(finding tort claims covered by the arbitration provision); Dr. Kenneth Ford v. NYLCARE Health 
Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 141 F.3d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating similar test). 
 87. See Lovey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 887 (Idaho 2003) (“For a tort 
claim to be considered as ‘arising out of or relating to’ a contract, it must, at a minimum, raise 
some issue the resolution of which requires reference to or construction of some portion of the 
contract itself.  The required relationship between the dispute and the contract does not exist 
simply because the dispute would not have arisen absent the existence of the contract between the 
parties.”) (citations omitted).  See also W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN 
PAULSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION 65 (3d ed. 2000) (“Since the 
very mechanism of arbitration is created by contract, and since the judicial sanction of tortious 
conduct does not contemplate a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant, claims 
based on alleged torts are generally not arbitrated. . . . [A]rbitration clauses contained in contracts 
antedating the dispute . . . may or may not, depending to a great extent on their wording, be 
deemed to cover claims of wrongful behavior that does not constitute breach of contract but is 
nevertheless connected with the contractual relationships.”). 
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choice-of-law question as to what law should be applied by the arbitrators in 
resolving the underlying dispute.  If the arbitration clause specifies governing law, 
that choice will raise the issues similar to those discussed above relating to whether 
contractual choice-of-law provisions will be followed by courts.88
Some authorities argue that arbitration is inefficient because it often does not 
result in cost savings.89  Writers also say that referral to arbitration injects into the 
dispute resolution process a level of legal unpredictability90 that will be 
disadvantageous to some or all of the participants.  In some instances, a program 
provider may therefore be better off having a tort claim reviewed by the judiciary 
in forums where clearly articulated rules of substantive and procedural law apply 
and where legal errors are subject to correction through appellate review.91
IV. CHOICE OF FORUM 
A question closely related to the efficacy of contractual choice-of-law92 or 
choice-of-arbitration93 provisions is the issue of whether the parties to a study 
abroad agreement may, if they prefer litigation to arbitration, contractually specify 
the forum in which a tort claim will be litigated.  The answer to this question 
echoes the analysis offered in the preceding sections.  On the one hand, similar to 
choice-of-law provisions, choice-of-forum provisions must be reasonable.  On the 
other hand, like an arbitration clause, a contractual choice-of-forum provision will 
govern the resolution of a tort claim only if that claim has such a relationship to the 
contract that it is fair to say that contractual language governs forum selection for 
the tort action.94
 88. See generally EDWARD BURNETT, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, JEAN R. STERNLIGHT & 
STEPHEN J. WARE, ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 79–83 (2006) 
(discussing power of parties to vary federal law by agreement); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 25 (1994) (“International arbitrators 
typically give effect to the parties’ agreements concerning applicable law.”); id. at 121 (“Despite 
this general recognition of party autonomy in the selection of substantive law, . . . some states 
will not enforce choice-of-law agreements if either: (a) the chosen law lacks a reasonable 
relationship to the parties’ transaction; or (b) the chosen law is contrary to some fundamental 
public policy of the forum, or, less clearly, another state.”); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exercise 
of Contract Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1189, 1219–20 (2003) (discussing governing law and stating that in some instances the “party 
provision may not be controlling”). 
 89. See Steven J. Burton, Combining Conciliation with Arbitration of International 
Commercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 637, 637 (1995) (“Though quick and 
inexpensive arbitration proceedings are possible, the delay and expense can be great when the 
stakes are high.”). 
 90. See William H. Krull, III & Noah B. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International 
Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 545 (2000) 
(discussing unpredictable or unprincipled arbitration awards). 
 91. See id. at 531 (“[F]inality would always be an asset if arbitrators, unlike distinguished 
judges, never made mistakes.”). 
 92. See supra Part II. 
 93. See supra Part III. 
 94. See Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Miss. Chem. Corp., 922 F. Supp. 1334, 1397 (N.D. Iowa 1996) 
(“[T]he critical question is not whether the language of the forum selection clause at issue 
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Addressing the first issue—the reasonableness of the contractually chosen 
forum—one court recently summarized the law as follows: 
as a general principle, private parties may agree to conduct all potential 
litigation arising out of a contract in a single jurisdiction.  Such Merger 
Agreements are presumptively valid and will be enforced by the forum 
unless the party objecting to its enforcement establishes: (i) it is a result 
of fraud or overreaching; (ii) enforcement would violate a strong public 
policy of the forum; or (iii) enforcement would, in the particular 
circumstances of the case, result in litigation in a jurisdiction so 
seriously inconvenient as to be unreasonable.  Generally put, forum 
selection clauses are enforced so long as enforcement at the time of 
litigation would not place any of the parties at a substantial and unfair 
disadvantage or otherwise deny a litigant his day in court.95
A contractual forum-selection clause requiring claims by study abroad 
participants to be litigated in an American state where the program provider is 
located, where the participant resides, or where a substantial part of the contract is 
to be performed might well be found to be reasonable.  In contrast, a clause 
requiring an American program participant to litigate a tort claim against an 
American program provider in a foreign country may be subject to challenge.  
Whether that challenge will be successful will depend upon the particular facts of 
the case.  Requiring a program participant to litigate a claim in a far away country 
with an under-developed legal system might be so seriously inconvenient as to 
effectively deny the litigant a day in court. 
The same is not necessarily true if one of the parties—the claimant or the 
program provider—is located in the foreign country which the choice-of-forum 
provision specifies as the forum for disputes.  That choice might be deemed to be 
reasonable since, when litigants reside in different countries, one or the other will 
inevitably be disadvantaged by litigating far from home.96  Indeed, in cases 
involving commercial disputes, courts have sometimes approved the choice of a 
forum located in a country to which neither party had a continuing relationship.  In 
one suit, where “a Houston-based American corporation, contracted with . . . a 
German corporation, to tow . . . [a] drilling rig . . . from Louisiana to a point off 
Ravenna, Italy,”97 the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a forum-
selection provision specifying the London Court of Justice.98  As Chief Justice 
expressly encompasses non-contract claims, but instead whether the non-contract claims asserted 
are directly or indirectly related to the contractual relationship of the parties.”), aff’d, 119 F.3d 
688, 693–95 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 95. Hadley v. Shaffer, No. Civ. A. 99-144-JJF, 2003 WL 21960406, at *4 (D. Del. Aug. 12, 
2003). 
 96. Cf. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 202 (3d Cir. 
1983) (rejecting, in a suit involving contract and tort claims related to a contract between a New 
Jersey corporation and a British corporation, the argument that the contractual choice of an 
English forum was “seriously inconvenient”), overruled on other grounds by Lauro Lines v. 
Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). 
 97. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 2 (1972). 
 98. Id. at 12 (holding that a forum-selection clause in a commercial agreement negotiated at 
VINCENT JOHNSON 8/28/2006  6:16:12 PM 
330 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 32, No. 2 
 
Warren Burger explained:  “[n]ot surprisingly, foreign businessmen prefer . . . to 
have disputes resolved in their own courts, but if that choice is not available, then 
in a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter.  Plainly, the courts of 
England meet the standards of neutrality and long experience in admiralty 
litigation.”99
Today, some courts, but not all, give heightened scrutiny to the fairness of 
forum-selection clauses not specifically negotiated by the parties.100  Courts also 
hold that “any ambiguity as to the mandatory or permissive nature of the forum 
selection clause should be construed against . . . [the] drafters.”101
Addressing the second issue—whether a contractual choice-of-forum provision 
governs claims in tort, as well as claims in contract—courts often focus on the 
source of the duty underlying the tort claim.  Thus, in a suit by an American third-
party beneficiary (Coastal) to an English contract between English companies 
(Farmer Norton and Tilghman), which contained a forum-selection clause 
specifying English courts, the Second Circuit wrote: 
 The second circumstance relied on by the district court for denying 
enforcement [of the choice of the English forum] is that Coastal has 
asserted tort claims as well as contract claims, and that the forum 
selection clause is inapplicable to the former.  The difficulty with this 
reasoning is that it ignores the reality that the Tilghman-Farmer Norton 
contract is the basic source of any duty to Coastal.  There is no evidence 
suggesting that the clause was not intended to apply to all claims 
growing out of the contractual relationship.  If forum selection clauses 
are to be enforced as a matter of public policy, that same public policy 
requires that they not be defeated by artful pleading of claims such as 
negligent design, breach of implied warranty, or misrepresentation.  
Coastal’s claims ultimately depend on the existence of a contractual 
relationship between Tilghman and Farmer Norton, and those parties 
bargained for an English forum.  We agree with those courts which 
have held that where the relationship between the parties is contractual, 
the pleading of alternative non-contractual theories of liability should 
not prevent enforcement of such a bargain. . . . [D]isregarding the forum 
selection clause was on this record improper.102
Consequently, whether a forum-selection clause encompasses a tort claim may 
depend upon the source of the duty at issue.  If the director of a study abroad 
program negligently backs a rental car over a program participant, it is doubtful 
that the resulting tort claim will be subject to a contractual choice-of-forum 
arm’s length should be enforced by the courts in the absence of a compelling countervailing 
reason that would make enforcement unreasonable). 
 99. Id. at 11–12. 
 100. See Forrest v. Verizon Commc’n, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1011 n.9 (D.C. 2002) 
(discussing the split of authority). 
 101. Beckley v. Auto Profit Masters, L.L.C., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 2003) 
(holding that a forum selection clause was permissive, rather than mandatory). 
 102. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d Cir. 1983), 
overruled on other grounds by Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). 
VINCENT JOHNSON 8/28/2006  6:16:12 PM 
2006] AMERICANS ABROAD 331 
 
provision.  The duty to exercise reasonable care in driving does not arise from the 
program provider-participant contract, but instead, if American law applies, from 
garden-variety common-law principles.103  Resolution of that tort claim also does 
not require reference to the terms of the program participation agreement.  In 
contrast, if a program provider is sued for misrepresentation based on allegedly 
false statements in the program’s advertising materials, those tort allegations may 
be so closely tied to the contractual relationship, and to related contract-law claims, 
that it is fair to say that they are encompassed by a forum-selection clause in the 
contract between the defendant program provider and the plaintiff participant.104  
“The better general rule . . . is that contract-related tort claims involving the same 
operative facts as a parallel claim for breach of contract should be heard in the 
forum selected by the contracting parties.”105  Of course, a broadly-worded forum-
selection clause is more likely to be deemed to encompass tort claims, because 
“[w]hether tort claims are governed by forum selection provisions depends upon 
the intention of the parties as reflected by the wording of the particular clauses and 
the facts of each case.”106
V. THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY 
Under American law, a program provider may be liable for injuries sustained by 
a participant in an international educational program under a broad array of 
theories.  These bases of liability include:  fault, respondeat superior, nondelegable 
duty, and ostensible agency. 
A. Fault 
First, an educational program may be subject to fault-based liability, such as 
 103. Beckley, 266 F. Supp. 2d at 1004–05 (holding that a forum-selection clause in a 
consulting agreement applied only to the business’s claims for breach of contract, and did not 
preclude the business from filing suit in another forum for fraudulent inducement, rescission, and 
violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). 
 104. But see id. at 1005 (holding that a forum selection clause was inapplicable for a claim 
for fraudulent inducement because that claim was “actionable independent of the contract itself”). 
 105. Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1121–22 (1st Cir. 1983).  See also Terra Int’l, Inc. v. 
Miss. Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 693–95 (8th Cir. 1997) (reviewing in detail the various tests 
adopted by courts for determining whether a contractual choice-of-forum provision encompasses 
tort claims and holding that the relevant question is whether the “tort claims involve the same 
operative facts as would a parallel claim for breach of contract”); CoBank, ACB v. Reorganized 
Farmers Coop. Ass’n, No. 04-3385, 2006 WL 620864, at *7 (10th Cir. Mar. 14, 2006) 
(“[G]enerally speaking, other circuits applying state law have determined a contract forum 
provision cannot apply to tort claims unless the provision is broad enough to be construed to 
cover such claims or the tort claims involve the same operative facts as a parallel breach of 
contract claim.”) (citations omitted). 
 106. Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 2004) 
(holding that claims against a licensee for misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition, 
and unjust enrichment, which were all premised on allegations that licensee’s use of software had 
gone beyond scope of the license agreement, came within scope of the agreement’s forum-
selection clause, which applied to “[a]ny lawsuit regarding this agreement”). 
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claims for negligent hiring,107 training,108 supervision,109 or retention of 
employees or agents;110 negligent selection, retention, or discipline of 
participants;111 or negligent failure to protect business invitees (e.g., students) from 
hazards on a foreign premises over which the program exercises control (e.g., 
classrooms or study areas).112  The principles of negligence-based liability will be 
 107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 19 (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (citing cases on negligent hiring). 
 108. Cf. Saville v. Sierra Coll., No. C047923, 2005 WL 3150521, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 
28, 2005) (holding that plaintiff failed to plead facts that would support a claim that college 
negligently failed to provide skilled instructors for a peace officer training class involving 
physical maneuvers). 
 109. See Molinari v. Tuskegee Univ., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1301–02 (M.D. Ala. 2004) 
(finding that a cause of action was stated as to whether allegedly negligent supervision of  a 
professor caused injuries to a student who was kicked by a cow); Shlien v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. 
of Neb., 640 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Neb. 2002) (discussing a claim based on alleged negligence for 
failing to properly supervise a professor’s Internet access and failing to have safeguards in place 
to prevent unauthorized publication of student material); Wood v. N.C. State Univ., 556 S.E.2d 
38, 39 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (alleging negligent retention and supervision of a professor who 
allegedly committed sexual harassment). 
 110. See Bell v. Univ. of V.I., No. Civ. 2000-0062, 2003 WL 23517144, at *3–4 (D.V.I. 
Nov. 19, 2003) (finding that a claim was stated for alleged negligent hiring and retaining of a 
professor who was known to be dangerous to students). 
 111. See Marro v. Fairfield Univ., No. CV040410044S, 2005 WL 3164148, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2005) (holding that it could not be said as a matter of law that a university, 
which allegedly had knowledge of students leaving the campus, consuming alcoholic beverages, 
and driving back to the university, had no duty to enforce its rules against such conduct). Cf. 
Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 268–69 (D.C. 2006) (finding that parents failed to 
establish the standard of care in a wrongful death suit alleging that the murder of their son 
resulted from the university’s insufficient disciplining of the student-murderer prior to the attack). 
 112. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, Paneno v. Centres for Academic Programmes 
Abroad Ltd., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 759 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. B162753) (describing claims for 
negligence and premises liability); Miano v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 736 N.Y.S.2d 556, 556 
(App. Div. 2002) (“[D]uties [to warn or make safe] were assumed by the College when it took 
control over the construction area.”).  See also Rogers v. Del. State Univ., No. Civ. A. 03C-03-
218-PLA, 2005 WL 2462271, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2005) (holding that a university that 
temporarily placed students in off-campus housing “had assumed a duty to provide the displaced 
students with reasonably safe accommodations”).  Persons who exercise control over the real 
property of others may be held liable if their invitees are injured on that property.  See generally 
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Shelburne, 576 So. 2d 322 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a duty of 
reasonable care to patrons extended to adjacent lots where patrons parked in accordance with the 
instructions of security guards), appeal dismissed, 589 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1991); Hopkins v. Fox & 
Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1120–21 (N.J. 1993) (stating that a real estate broker owes 
reasonable care to prospective buyers touring an open house); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex. 1993) (finding that a lessee exercised control over a 
construction ramp, even though the lease covered only space inside the building); Orthmann v. 
Apple River Campground, Inc., 757 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Whoever controls the land is 
responsible for its safety.”).  Of course, there may be a real question as to whether a program 
exercises “control” over a foreign educational premises.  An American program provider may be 
permitted to use the classrooms and offices of a foreign college or university, but it may have no 
right to make alterations to those facilities or even to employ persons to clean or make repairs.  
Presumably, these limitations will be relevant to determining just what the duty of reasonable 
care requires.  It may be fair to expect the American program provider to call dangers to the 
attention of the foreign host institution or program participants, but not fair to fault the American 
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considered in detail below in Part VI. 
B. Respondeat Superior 
Second, a program provider may be subject to strict liability of a respondeat 
superior113 variety for the torts of employees114 committed within the scope of 
their employment.115  In the study abroad context, the scope of employment for 
administrators and faculty members may be broad.116  The director of a foreign 
program may be “on duty” virtually all day.117  If an American-run foreign study 
program employs foreign faculty or staff, different legal principles may govern 
liability issues relating to that employment relationship.118  The faculty member’s 
day may consist of activities, which, though not separately compensated,119 in a 
program provider for repairs that have not been made.  Cf. Bird v. Lewis & Clark Coll., 303 F.3d 
1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the rejection of a proposed jury instruction relating to 
accommodation of disabilities under federal law because the instruction implied that an American 
college was “required to make structural modifications to the buildings in Australia”). 
 113. Respondeat superior is a Latin phrase meaning “let the superior make answer.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004). 
 114. If the employee did not commit a tort, the theory of respondeat superior is inapplicable.  
See Geiersbach v. Frieje, 807 N.E.2d 114, 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that summary 
judgment was properly granted to the coaches and the university was not vicariously liable). 
 115. Cf. Chambers v. Lehmann, No. 262502, 2005 WL 2291889 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 
2005) (discussing a tort claim involving a university vehicle driven by a university employee on 
campus). 
 116. Courts differ in how tightly or narrowly they focus the scope-of-employment inquiry.  
Compare Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 448 (Cal. 1995) (“In 
California, the scope of employment has been interpreted broadly. . . . For example, ‘the fact that 
an employee is not engaged in the ultimate object of his employment at the time of his wrongful 
act does not preclude attribution of liability to an employer.’ . . . Moreover, ‘where the employee 
is combining his own business with that of his employer, or attending to both at substantially the 
same time, no nice inquiry will be made as to which business he was actually engaged in at the 
time of injury, unless it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could he have been 
serving his employer.’”) (citations omitted), with O’Toole v. Carr, 815 A.2d 471, 473 (N.J. 2003) 
(declining to adopt a broad approach which would too readily subject businesses to liability for 
harm incidental to their activities). 
 117. This is important because “off-duty” conduct is ordinarily not within the scope of 
employment.  See Freeman v. Busch, 150 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004 (S.D. Iowa 2001) (holding, in 
part, that a college was not vicariously liable for a student employee’s alleged omissions of his 
duties as a security guard because the student employee was not on duty when a party guest was 
raped in a dormitory).  See also Burroughs v. Massachusetts, 673 N.E.2d 1217, 1219 (Mass. 
1996) (holding that an off-duty national guard member who served as a bartender at the armory 
was not within the scope of his employment); Ginther v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 300 
(Tex. App. 2002) (finding no liability because the driver’s shift had ended and he had left work 
almost two hours earlier). 
 118. See generally Part II (discussing choice of law). 
 119. Cf. Bishop v. Texas A & M Univ., 35 S.W.3d 605, 607 (Tex. 2000) (holding, in a suit 
arising from an accidental stabbing during a university play, that the faculty advisors to a drama 
club were employees, not volunteers, because, even though they were not separately paid for that 
activity, service as an advisor to a student organization was considered in determining overall 
compensation). 
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very real sense are intended, at least in part, to benefit the business purposes120 of 
the program provider.  Entertaining visiting faculty members, hosting dinners, and 
leading walking tours around the town may fall within this category.  An excursion 
down the valley by car with other faculty members might be a mixture of business 
and pleasure, and if an auto accident occurs, there may be a plausible argument 
that the allegedly negligent driving was within the scope of the director’s 
employment.121  Conduct—even ill-advised conduct122—that is intended, in part, 
to further the business purposes of the employer,123 and done as part of the 
employer’s business,124 may raise an issue of fact sufficient to support a finding of 
respondeat superior liability.125
 120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2004) (“An 
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an independent 
course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of the employer.”); 
Haybeck v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 944 F. Supp. 326, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that having sex 
with a company client away from the place of employment was not within the scope of 
employment even if the employee’s conduct arose in part from a desire to encourage the plaintiff 
to use more of the employer’s services), appeal dismissed on other grounds, 116 F.3d 465 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
 121. See, e.g., Mayes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 144 S.W.3d 50, 56 (Tex. App. 2004) 
(finding the evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a driver 
was within the course and scope of his employment, despite being on a personal errand, where, 
among other things, the driver “was available via pager 24 hours a day; and . . . was not restricted 
in any way from using the truck for personal business”). 
 122. See Smith v. Lannert, 429 S.W.2d 8, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (holding a grocery store 
liable for injuries that resulted when a supervisor spanked a cashier for taking an unauthorized 
break.  “[T]he jury could find Lannert’s act in striking plaintiff was to enforce employee 
discipline with respect to orders given by the store manager with reference to employee rest 
breaks, thus promoting Bettendorf-Rapp’s purpose of keeping an adequate work force on the 
floor and maintaining employee discipline”). 
 123. Cf. Bell v. Univ. of V.I., No. Civ. 2000-0062, 2003 WL 23517144, at *3 (V.I. Nov. 19, 
2003) (holding that a university was entitled to partial summary judgment on claims for assault, 
battery, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress because the plaintiff student 
did not and could not show that the invasive conduct of the professor “served” the university or 
that the professor was “hired to push students”). 
 124. See Commercial Bank v. Hearn, 923 So. 2d 202, 206–07 (Miss. 2006) (stating that “[a]n 
indirect benefit to the employer . . . is not the appropriate test for respondeat superior. . . . The 
inquiry is . . . whether, from the nature of the act itself as actually done, it was an act done in the 
master’s business, or wholly disconnected therefrom by the servant, not as servant, but as an 
individual on his own account”). 
 125. Section 228 of Second Restatement of Agency provides that the:  
Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and 
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of the force is 
not unexpectable by the master. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958).  The evolving Third Restatement of Agency 
proposes a somewhat different test for scope of employment: 
An employee acts within the scope of employment when performing work assigned by 
the employer or engaging in a course of conduct subject to the employer’s control.  An 
employee’s act is not within the scope of employment when it occurs within an 
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C. Non-delegable Duty 
Third, although employers,126 including educational program providers,127 are 
ordinarily not liable for the torts of agents who are independent contractors,128 
strict liability may be imposed on an employer if an independent contractor 
breaches a non-delegable duty.129  American law on non-delegable duties is in 
many respects unclear.  The Second Restatement of Torts acknowledges that 
“[f]ew courts have made any attempt to state any general principles as to when the 
employer’s duty cannot be delegated, and it may as yet be impossible to reduce 
these exceptions to such principles.”130  However, the same authority then 
provides that a duty is non-delegable and a principal therefore cannot shift 
responsibility for the proper conduct of work to an independent contractor if the 
work requires “special precautions,”131 is to be done in a public place,132 involves 
instrumentalities used in highly dangerous activities,133 is subject to safety 
requirements imposed by legislation or administrative regulation,134 is itself 
inherently dangerous,135 or involves an “abnormally dangerous” activity.136  It is 
independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of 
the employer. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(2) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2004).  Conduct not 
intended to further any business purpose of the employer ordinarily will not give rise to 
respondeat superior liability.  See Jones v. Baisch, 40 F.3d 252 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that 
leaking confidential information was not within the scope of employment); Minyard Food Stores, 
Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. 2002) (holding that a manager was not acting within 
the scope of his employment when he lied during a workplace investigation). 
 126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (stating the general rule that a 
principal is ordinarily not vicariously liable for the torts of an agent who is an independent 
contractor); Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Tex. 1998) (“Because 
an independent contractor has sole control over the means and methods of the work to be 
accomplished, . . . the individual or entity that hires the independent contractor is generally not 
vicariously liable for the tort or negligence of that person.”).  See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 2.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (“Respondeat superior is inapplicable when 
a principal does not have the right to control the actions of the agent.”). 
 127. See Texas A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 584–85 (Tex. 2005) (holding that a 
university was not liable for the allegedly tortious conduct of a play’s director and prop assistant, 
who were independent contractors rather than state employees). 
 128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958) (“An independent contractor is 
a person who contracts with another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the 
other nor subject to the other’s right to control with respect to his physical conduct in the 
performance of the undertaking.”). 
 129. See, e.g., Gazo v. City of Stamford, 765 A.2d 505, 511 (Conn. 2001) (stating that “the 
nondelegable duty doctrine means that the party with such a duty . . . may not absolve itself of 
liability by contracting out the performance of that duty”). 
 130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 introductory note (1965). 
 131. Id. § 416; see also § 413 (imposing negligence-based liability relating to harm caused 
by an independent contractor’s failure to take special precautions). 
 132. Id. §§ 417–18. 
 133. Id. § 423. 
 134. Id. § 424. 
 135. Id. § 427 (“One who employs an independent contractor to do work involving a special 
danger to others which the employer knows or has reason to know to be inherent in or normal to 
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possible that these broad, loosely-defined categories may encompass certain 
activities that are part of a foreign study program. 
For example, a program provider might be subject to a non-delegable-duty 
claim based on hiring a person or company to transport a handicapped student who 
is confined to a wheel chair137 or to guide a hike into the mountains on the theory 
that the transportation or excursion required “special precautions.”138  Similarly, a 
program provider operating in a dangerous country139 might be liable for an 
independent contractor’s failure to exercise reasonable care in transporting 
participants, on the ground that the activity of arranging travel for persons in a 
dangerous country is, by definition, inherently dangerous,140 in the sense that the 
risks of harm cannot be eliminated despite the exercise of all reasonable care.141  
the work, or which he contemplates or has reason to contemplate when making the contract, is 
subject to liability for physical harm caused to such others by the contractor’s failure to take 
reasonable precautions against such danger.”).  One court stated: 
  The theory upon which this liability is based is that a person who engages a 
contractor to do work of an inherently dangerous character remains subject to an 
absolute, nondelegable duty to see that it is performed with that degree of care which is 
appropriate to the circumstances, or in other words, to see that all reasonable 
precautions shall be taken during its performance, to the end that third persons may be 
effectually protected against injury.  
Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 41 AM. JUR. 
2D Independent Contractors § 41 (1968)).   
 136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427A (1965). 
 137. See Kelly v. United Airlines, Inc., 986 F. Supp. 684, 687 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding, in a 
suit where a handicapped passenger sustained injuries when she fell out of an aisle chair while 
being boarded on an airplane, that the airline could be liable, under § 427 of the Restatement of 
Torts, for the negligence of the contractor who provided the wheelchair services.  The 
Restatement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 (1965), imposes “vicarious liability 
making the employer liable for the negligence of the independent contractor in failing to guard 
against a special danger, irrespective of whether the employer has itself been at fault”). 
 138. But see Ignato v. Wilmington Coll., Inc., No. 03C-05-87, 2005 WL 2475750, at *1 (Del. 
Aug. 22, 2005) (finding the “peculiar risk” doctrine of the Restatement, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 413 (1965), inapplicable to the case of a student injured during flight training). 
 139. For example, a dangerous country may be considered one for which the U.S. State 
Department has issued a Travel Warning.  “Travel Warnings are issued when the State 
Department recommends that Americans avoid a certain country.”  See U.S. Dep’t  of State, 
Current Travel Warnings, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_1764.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2006). 
 140. But see Chainani v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 663 N.E.2d 283, 287 (N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he 
activity of transporting children by bus to and from school—successfully accomplished countless 
times daily—does not involve that sort of inherent risk for the nonnegligent driver and is simply 
not an inherently dangerous activity so as to trigger vicarious liability.”). 
 141. Id.  In Chainani, the court explained the non-delegable-duty rule relating to inherently 
dangerous activities in the following terms: 
This State has long recognized an exception from the general rule [of non-liability for 
the acts of an independent contractor] where, generically, the activity involved is 
“dangerous in spite of all reasonable care.” . . . This exception applies when it appears 
both that “the work involves a risk of harm inherent in the nature of the work itself 
[and] that the employer recognizes, or should recognize, that risk in advance of the 
contract.” 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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The Restatement commentary explains this type of employer liability for the 
conduct of an independent contractor in these words: 
It is not . . . necessary to the employer’s liability that the work be of a 
kind which cannot be done without a risk of harm to others . . . . It is 
sufficient that work of any kind involves a risk, recognizable in advance, 
of physical harm to others which is inherent in the work itself, or 
normally to be expected in the ordinary course of the usual or 
prescribed way of doing it, or that the employer has special reason to 
contemplate such a risk under the particular circumstances under 
which the work is to be done.142
The sweep of this definition of what constitutes an “inherently dangerous” 
activity is soberingly broad.  Although a number of recent cases have imposed 
liability under the rule,143 no case has involved a study abroad program.  If 
program-related activities in a dangerous country were held to be inherently 
dangerous because material risks could not be eliminated through the exercise of 
reasonable care, the provider might nevertheless avoid liability to a student based 
on a defense of primary assumption of the risk.144  That is, it could be argued, with 
legal plausibility, that a student’s voluntary participation in a study abroad program 
in a dangerous country is an assumption of inherent risks.  There is support for this 
type of argument in decided cases.  Some courts have said that “the inherently 
dangerous activity doctrine was designed to protect third parties, not those actively 
involved in the dangerous activity.”145  However, other courts have held that 
 142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427 cmt. b (1965) (emphasis added). 
 143. By far, the greater number of courts that have considered the inherently-dangerous-
activity exception have found it inapplicable to the facts before them.  However, several recent 
cases have applied the exception.  See McMillian v. United States, 112 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that activity of felling all of the trees in a right-of-way corridor was inherently 
dangerous); Maldonado v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, L.L.C., 154 S.W.3d 303, 310 (E.D. Mo. 
2003) (holding that a boxing match was an inherently dangerous activity, and therefore a hotel 
was liable for the negligence of an independent contractor who failed to provide post-fight 
medical care); Hatch v. V.P. Fair Found., Inc., 990 S.W.2d 126, 135–36 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) 
(finding that bungee jumping was an inherently dangerous activity); Beckman v. Butte-Silver 
Bow County, 1 P.3d 348 (Mont. 2000) (holding that trenching is an inherently dangerous activity 
because the risks of death or serious bodily injury are well recognized and special precautions are 
required to prevent a cave-in that could bury a worker); Enriquez v. Cochran, 967 P.2d 1136, 
1162 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that felling dead trees is an inherently dangerous activity); 
Pusey v. Bator, 762 N.E.2d 968, 975 (Ohio 2002) (holding that if an employer hires independent 
contractor to provide armed security guards to protect property, the inherently-dangerous-work 
exception is triggered, and that if someone is injured by the weapon as result of a guard’s 
negligence, the employer is vicariously liable even though the guard is an employee of the 
independent contractor). 
 144. See generally Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470, 476–77 (7th Cir. 
1991) (differentiating express assumption of risk, primary implied assumption of risk, and 
secondary implied assumption of risk).  “In primary implied assumption of risk, the plaintiff 
assumes risks inherent in the nature of the activity” and is completely barred from recovery.  Id. 
at 477.  See infra text accompanying note 161. 
 145. DeShambo v. Nielsen, 684 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Mich. 2004) (involving an employee of 
independent contractor who was injured while cutting timber).  See also Apostal v. Oliveri 
Constr. Co., 678 N.E.2d 756, 761 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997) (stating, in the context of a similar non-
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voluntary participants in inherently dangerous activities, such as logging, were not 
barred from recovery based on their participation, although their conduct might 
constitute comparative negligence that would reduce their recovery.146  The 
application of these theories to injuries arising in connection with study abroad has 
yet to be charted.  Obviously, there are many unanswered questions and plenty of 
room for dispute.147  Among the numerous uncertainties is the fact that whether an 
activity is ‘inherently dangerous’ is ordinarily a question for the jury, not the 
court.148
D. Ostensible Agency 
Fourth, liability may be imposed on a program provider based on an ostensible 
agency theory.149  Thus, even if the person is not actually an agent or employee 
acting within the scope of employment, a program provider might be subject to 
liability essentially on estoppel grounds if its conduct led the injured person (e.g., a 
student) to believe that the tortfeasor was acting on behalf of the provider and 
thereby induced reliance.  This theory of liability may have considerable 
applicability to a foreign program where the lines of responsibility are blurred and 
delegable duty argument, that the “nondelegable duty . . . runs to third parties, not to employees 
of the independent contractor”). 
 146. See, e.g., McMillian v. United States, 112 F.3d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir. 1997) (reducing the 
damages awarded to a logging contractor’s employee based on the employee’s comparative 
negligence). 
 147. See Dexter v. Town of Norway, 715 A.2d 169, 172 (Me. 1998) (holding, in a case 
arising from a fire, that the defendant might be liable for negligent selection of an independent 
contractor, but “[w]e are far less certain whether and under what circumstances we would 
recognize the doctrine variously described as involving ‘a peculiar unreasonable risk’ (section 
413), ‘a peculiar risk’ (section 416) or ‘a special danger’ (section 427)”). 
 148. See Fry v. Diamond Constr., Inc., 659 A.2d 241, 249 (D.C. 1995) (holding, in a suit for 
personal injuries sustained when the plaintiff fell off of a ladder that had been placed on a 
scaffold, that for purposes of the rule, an employer is liable for injuries caused by negligence of 
independent contractor if the activity is inherently dangerous.  The existence of danger and 
knowledge of it by employer are normally questions of fact for jury).  See also Huddleston v. 
Union Rural Elec. Ass’n, 841 P.2d 282, 286 (Colo. 1992) (finding that it was for the jury to 
determine whether it was inherently dangerous for a charter airline to fly passengers in winter to 
the mountains in an unpressurized plane that was uncertified for flights into icy conditions); 
Bohme, Inc. v. Sprint Int’l Commc’n, 686 N.E.2d 300, 309 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a 
fact issue existed as to whether installation and maintenance work by the defendant’s independent 
contractors on a ten ton rooftop air conditioning unit was inherently dangerous).  But see Hatch, 
990 S.W.2d at 135–36 (“To initially determine whether an activity is inherently dangerous, the 
trial judge should begin by ascertaining the nature of the activity and the manner in which the 
activity is ordinarily performed.  If after considering these factors the trial court concludes the 
activity does not involve some peculiar risk of harm, then the activity is not inherently dangerous 
as a matter of law.  If the trial court does not so find, then the question should be submitted to the 
jury.”) (citations omitted). 
 149. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1958) (providing that a 
party asserting ostensible agency must demonstrate that the principal, by its conduct, caused the 
party to reasonably believe that the putative agent was an employee or agent of the principal, and 
that the party justifiably relied on the appearance of the agency relationship).  See also Baptist 
Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 949 (Tex. 1998) (applying an ostensible-agency 
analysis to a claim based on the conduct of a physician staffing a hospital emergency room). 
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shifting.  A visiting faculty member hired only to teach a course may be enlisted to 
lead a field trip to the local courts or to drive an ill student to the hospital.  If the 
conduct results in an accidental injury, it will probably be no defense for the 
program provider to argue that the faculty member was not hired or paid to 
perform that job.  If the program’s information booklet for students lists white-
water rafting companies as an available form of recreation, or if fliers for hang-
gliding vendors are posted in the student dormitory, it may be legally advantageous 
to inform students that those enterprises operate independently, not as agents for 
the program provider or with the provider’s endorsement.150
VI. NEGLIGENCE 
A. Reasonable Care and Foreseeability 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the general rule in American tort 
law is that all persons are required to exercise reasonable care in their activities to 
protect other persons from physical harm.151  The duty of reasonable care means 
that an actor must employ cost-effective measures to prevent injuries.152  On the 
home campus this may mean that a college or university will be held liable for 
“failure to install simple, inexpensive locks or latches on the shower doors.”153  
Similarly, at both home and foreign campuses, a program provider may have a 
duty to disclose a variety of  risks which are known to the provider but unlikely to 
be discovered by students,154 assuming it is inexpensive and useful for the provider 
 150. But see McClure v. Fairfield Univ., 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 169, 169 (Super. Ct. 2003) 
(finding that a university had assumed a duty to provide safe transportation between the campus 
and a beach where drinking took place.  The court noted that “the university’s providing 
information about the beach area housing in the student binder was an imprimatur”). 
 151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the 
actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”); see generally Vincent R. Johnson, Tort Law in 
America at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 1 RENMIN U. CHINA L. REV. 237, 241 (2000) 
(discussing the general rule). 
 152. See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(stating that if the probability of harm is called P, the gravity of the threatened injury or loss 
called L, and the burden of preventing the loss called B, “liability depends upon whether B is less 
than L multiplied by P,” in other words, whether B is less than PL); JOHNSON & GUNN, supra 
note 33, at 250 (stating that the B < L x P formula “suggests . . . that if the chance of an accident 
is high, it makes more sense to devote resources to safety than if the chance of an accident is low, 
other things being equal. . . . And the formula teaches that, other things being equal, resources 
spent to prevent accidents that threaten serious injury are better spent than if they had gone to 
reduce minor scrapes”). 
 153. Shivers v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 2000-02461, 2005 WL 517450, at *4 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 
Jan. 6, 2005) (holding that a university’s failure to install locks or latches was a breach of the duty 
of care that proximately caused plaintiff’s injury). 
 154. Cf. Sy v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., No. B172235, 2005 WL 950006, at *4 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Apr. 26, 2005) (finding a university not liable for failure to warn because while “[h]idden or 
obscured dangers of property may require the responsible landowner to warn of those conditions  
. . . there are no allegations that the presence of trains on this track was hidden or obscured”). 
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to give such warning.155  For example, if the director of a foreign program knows 
that in recent years students have been harassed or molested while walking in a 
certain area near the program’s dormitories, reasonable care may require disclosure 
of that information.156
 155. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 
57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 276 (2005) (“In addressing questions of duty in unsettled areas of the law, 
courts often ask whether imposition of duty makes sense as a matter of public policy.  They 
consider, for example, whether obligating the defendant to exercise care would tend to minimize 
harm to potential plaintiffs without being unduly burdensome to the defendant or disruptive to the 
community.”); see, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (Cal. 1976) 
(holding that where a patient confided an intention to kill another student to a psychologist 
employed by the university hospital, and the psychologist referred the matter to police but did not 
actually warn the other student, who was then killed, the complaint of the victim’s parents stated 
a cause of action against the university.  “If the exercise of reasonable care to protect the 
threatened victim requires the therapist to warn the endangered party or those who can reasonably 
be expected to notify him, we see no sufficient societal interest that would protect and justify 
concealment”); Nova Se. Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 2000) (stating that a 
“university may be found liable in tort where it assigns a student to an internship site which it 
knows to be unreasonably dangerous but gives no warning, or inadequate warning”); Stanton v. 
Univ. of Me., 773 A.2d 1045 (Me. 2001) (holding that a university owed a duty to a 
seventeen-year-old student-athlete, as a business invitee attending a pre-season soccer program, to 
advise the student of steps she could take to improve her personal safety; the student was sexually 
assaulted by a companion she had admitted into her dormitory); see also Mostert v. CBL & 
Assoc., 741 P.2d 1090, 1094–95 (Wyo. 1987) (recognizing a duty to warn theater patrons of off-
premises dangers posed by a developing storm of great severity because, among other things, the 
“burden of passing [that] superior knowledge on to patrons regarding the flood appears to be 
minimal”).  Under the law of deceit, there is a similar duty to reveal facts not reasonably 
discoverable by the plaintiff, for otherwise the plaintiff would “simply be relegated to making a 
potentially bad decision without access to material information.”  Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn 
M. Lovorn, Misrepresentation by Lawyers About Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 
529, 539–43 (2004). 
 156. The issue here is complex—at least when viewed from a premises-liability perspective.  
A business has a duty to protect business invitees from hazards on property over which the 
business exercises control.  See supra note 112.  That rule may apply to a foreign campus over 
which a program exercises control.  The question would then be whether there was a duty to warn 
of dangers in proximity to that foreign premises.  Some cases—but certainly not all—say that a 
duty to warn invitees of dangers extends to hazards outside the premises which the invitee may 
foreseeably encounter.  Compare Ember v. B.F.D., Inc., 490 N.E.2d 764, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1986) (stating that a duty of reasonable care extends “beyond the business premises when it is 
reasonable for the invitees to believe the invitor controls premises adjacent to his own or where 
the invitor knows his invitees customarily use the adjacent premises in connection with the 
invitation”), and Mulraney v. Auletto’s Catering, 680 A.2d 793, 795 (N.J. 1996) (recognizing a 
duty to protect customers from dangers in an area neither owned nor controlled by the proprietor, 
but which the proprietor knew or should have known its customers would use for parking), with 
Frampton v. Hutcherson, 784 N.E.2d 993, 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that homeowners 
were not liable for negligence to a pedestrian who was injured on a sidewalk in front of their 
home because the sidewalk was owned by the city), Rhudy v. Bottlecaps Inc., 830 A.2d 402, 
406–07 (Del. 2003) (holding that a business that advertised the availability of nearby free public 
parking was not liable for harm caused at that location by a robber because the business did not 
control the lot or increase the risk of harm to patrons parking there), and Kuzmicz v. Ivy Hill Park 
Apts., Inc., 688 A.2d 1018, 1024 (N.J. 1997) (holding that a landlord did not owe a duty to 
tenants to protect them from criminal assaults on a city-owned vacant lot located between the 
complex and a shopping center, either by warning them of the risks of assault on the lot, or by 
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There is generally no duty to warn college or university students of known or 
obvious dangers, such as a pothole in a parking lot,157 snow or ice on exterior 
steps,158 discovered water in a hallway,159 or the risk of falling from a high 
bluff.160  This is because it is reasonable to expect persons who have reached 
maturity to guard against risks that are already known or obvious.  Similarly, there 
is no duty to protect others against risks that are such an inherent and foreseeable 
part of an activity that they are deemed to be assumed by voluntary 
participation.161  A student who engages in rock climbing while participating in an 
educational program need not be told of the risk of falling, since “[f]alling, 
whether because of one’s own slip, a co-climber’s stumble, or an anchor system 
giving way, is the very risk inherent in the sport of mountain climbing and cannot 
making more exhaustive efforts to mend the fence that separated the complex from the lot).  See 
also Udy v. Calvary Corp., 780 P.2d 1055, 1062 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that a landlord 
could be liable for injuries to a child which occurred beyond the boundaries of the landlord’s 
property where the child’s parents had repeatedly asked the landlord to erect a fence to keep their 
small children off a busy street); Walton v. Spindle, 484 N.E.2d 469, 472–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) 
(holding a tavern owner not liable for injuries sustained outside the tavern in a fight which began 
in the tavern). 
 157. See White v. Univ. of Toledo, No. 2004-03772-AD, 2004 WL 2804875, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
Cl. Aug. 24, 2004) (finding that a student failed to establish that a pothole in a university parking 
lot was not open, obvious, and readily discernable, and therefore could not recover in a premises 
liability action). 
 158. See Cory v. Davenport Coll. of Bus., 649 N.W.2d 392, 394 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that snowy and icy steps leading up to a dormitory constitutes an open and obvious 
danger); Lee v. Univ. of Akron, No. 2003–03132–AD, 2003 WL 21694740, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 
July 11, 2003) (finding that no action for negligence was stated because the plaintiff “should have 
realized the steps would have been slippery from a natural accumulation of falling snow and 
climatic conditions”). 
 159. See Conrad v. Miami Univ., No. 2002-10364-AD, 2003 WL 1985214, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
Cl. Apr. 9, 2003) (finding that two inches of water in a basement hallway was an open and 
obvious danger); Underwood v. Univ. of Akron, No. 2003-01814-AD, 2003 WL 21540668, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. Cl. June 18, 2003) (finding no liability because the water from melted snow was known 
to the plaintiff). 
 160. See Anderson v. Principia Corp., 202 F. Supp. 2d 950, 960 (E.D. Mo. 2001) 
(recognizing the open and obvious danger rule and finding that the forgetfulness or distraction 
exception did not apply in a suit against a college where a student’s fall from a bluff while he was 
intoxicated resulted in his death). 
 161. See Saville v. Sierra Coll., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 515, 522 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a 
negligence claim was barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, which applied to 
arrest and control techniques that were part of a peace officer training class at a community 
college).  Compare Torres v. Univ. of Mass., No. 04-2377, 2005 WL 3629285, at *2 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2005) (holding that while a “majority of jurisdictions which have considered 
this issue have concluded that personal injury cases arising out of an athletic event must be 
predicated on reckless disregard of safety,” that rule did not apply in a case involving injuries 
sustained during cheerleading practice because the “plaintiff was not engaged in competition at 
the time of her accident, and . . . the supervision she advocates would not interfere with the 
activity she was engaged in, even had it been at a game or a cheerleading competition rather than 
a practice”), with Vistad v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. A04-2161, 2005 WL 1514633, 
at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 28, 2005) (finding that a cheerleader was barred from recovering for 
injuries resulting from a fall by primary assumption of risk). 
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be completely eliminated without destroying the sport itself.”162
Foreseeability of harm is the single most important concept in the law of 
negligence.163  Absent foreseeability of injury, there is no liability for failure to 
exercise care.  In cases against colleges and universities, the decisions often turn 
on a factual determination as to whether the risk in question—such as an attack by 
an intruder164—was or was not foreseeable. 
Of course, the question is not whether someone thinking about an unlikely or 
far-fetched set of events could have foreseen a risk of harm.  (If that were the 
standard, persons who read novels or watch TV or movies would be able to 
“foresee” everything and have endless duties under tort law.)  Rather, the question 
is whether a reasonable person familiar with the circumstances would have 
anticipated a risk of such “weight and moment”165 as to have fair notice that 
precautions were required.  As courts sometimes say, the question is not whether 
harm was “possible,” but whether it was “probable”166—“probable” not in the 
sense of more likely than not to occur,167 but in the sense of being sufficiently 
likely and important as to require evasive action.  One recent case found that the 
mere possibility that one college roommate might “theoretically” cause harm to 
another was insufficient to support a finding that the university was negligent in 
assigning the students to live together.168
 162. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 925–26 (Ct. App. 
1996) (holding that a university was not liable, under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, 
for the death of a student in rock-climbing class). 
 163. See generally W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921, 
921 (2005) (“Foreseeability of a risk of injury has for centuries rested at the heart of court 
determinations of whether a defendant breached its duty of care.”); Edward von Gerichten, Tort 
Litigation in Higher Education, 26 J.C. & U.L. 245, 266 (1999) (“[F]oreseeability of harm is a 
major issue that will be looked at by the courts in determining whether an institution owes a duty 
to the student and . . . courts are willing to extend this duty even when the harm occurs at 
locations off-campus, if the activity being engaged in by the student was directly and causally 
related to her academic program.”). 
 164. See, e.g., Rogers v. Del. State Univ., No. Civ. A.03C-03-218-PLA, 2005 WL 246, at *6 
(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2005) (holding that a university could not be liable for failure to prevent 
an attack that was “planned as an ambush and could not have been reasonably foreseen”); Agnew 
Scott Coll., Inc. v. Clark, 616 S.E.2d 468, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (“[G]eneral crime statistics 
and student concerns about walking alone in a parking lot at night [do not] create an issue of fact 
regarding the foreseeability of a random attack on a student in broad daylight in the parking lot.”); 
Kleisch v. Cleveland State Univ., No. 2003-05452, 2005 WL 663214, at *3 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Feb. 22, 
2005) (holding that a university had no duty to protect student from being raped in a classroom on 
a weekday morning during final examinations because the rape was not foreseeable since 
university was unaware of the rapist’s presence or motives until after the attack). 
 165. Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams, 185 So. 234, 236 (Miss. 1938) (stating that negligence 
requires a “likelihood [of harm that] is of such appreciable weight and moment as to induce . . . 
action to avoid it on the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind”). 
 166. See, e.g., Nussbaum v. Lacopo, 265 N.E.2d 762, 767 (N.Y. 1970) (holding that the fact 
that a golfing accident was “merely possible” was not enough to prove negligence, which must be 
“probable”). 
 167. Gulf Refining Co., 185 So. at 235 (“[I]t is not necessary that the chances that a damage 
will result shall be greater than the chances that no damage will occur.”). 
 168. See Rhaney v. Univ. Md. E. Shore, 880 A.2d 357, 366 n.10 (Md. 2005) (stating that 
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Determining whether there is sufficiently foreseeable risk of harm to impose 
liability for lack of care is a fact-specific task.  The assessment requires 
consideration of the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood that harm will occur, the 
type of damage that might be caused, and the availability of options for avoiding 
the risk of harm.169  For liability to arise, a particular risk must be so clear and 
probable that a reasonable person would be on notice of what needed to be 
prevented and have some idea of what to do.  The mere fact that Americans 
traveling abroad might be harmed somewhere in the world by extremists is such a 
vague risk that it probably imposes no particular duty on any foreign study 
program.  In contrast, notice of serious danger to a limited class of persons may 
trigger a duty to exercise care.170  If a terrorist group targets Americans studying in 
a particular city, a provider operating a program at that location must exercise a 
degree of care commensurate with the gravity and specificity of the threat.  In a 
given case, the duty of reasonable care may entail the preparation of contingency 
plans for evacuating students or may even preclude the provider from sending 
additional students to that site as long as the threat persists.171
In some cases, liability depends on whether there have been prior similar 
incidents of harm.172  If, absent such events, the risk would not have been 
“[o]ne could argue theoretically that some type of harm inevitably would fall upon any future 
roommate” of a student who had been previously disciplined for fighting, but that “foreseeability 
is not nearly wide enough to include a possible result, but deals more with the probability of that 
result.  Without more than the one incident in this record, which involved multiple people in a 
social setting, . . . the probability of Clark assaulting his prospective roommate at the time [the 
university assigned them] as roommates was not high,” and therefore there was no basis for 
holding the university liable for negligence). 
 169. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. d (1965) (stating that 
“[t]he magnitude of the risk is to be compared with what the law regards as the utility of the act”). 
 170. See Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ. v. Strain, 771 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding that the evidence supported a finding that a state university was negligent in failing to 
supply a portable dance floor for a performance at a high school because the evidence showed 
that the university knew that the floor at the high school auditorium was uneven and subject to 
splintering). 
 171. See Watson, supra note 1, at 10 (discussing threats against American colleges and 
universities operating programs in Florence during the Gulf War); Hoye, supra note 20, at 11 
(noting a threat of international terrorism that prompted one university to withdraw students from 
Israel). 
 172. In a recent case, a court stated:  
  In determining whether previous criminal acts are substantially similar to the 
occurrence causing harm, thereby establishing the foreseeability of risk, the court must 
inquire into the location, nature and extent of the prior criminal activities and their 
likeness, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question.  While the prior 
criminal activity must be substantially similar to the particular crime in question, that 
does not mean identical.  What is required is that the prior incident be sufficient to 
attract the [landowner’s] attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the 
litigated incident.  
Agnes Scott Coll., Inc. v. Clark, 616 S.E.2d 468, 470–71 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Sturbridge 
Partners v. Walter, 482 S.E.2d 339, 341 (Ga. 1997)).  See also Rogers v. Del. State Univ., No. 
Civ. A. 03C-218-PLA, 2005 WL 2462271, at *6 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2005) (“Evidence of 
only one prior criminal incident, irrespective of a higher crime rate in the area of the property, is 
insufficient as a matter of law with regard to the issue of foreseeability.”). 
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reasonably foreseeable, liability may depend on such incidents.173  One court 
recently held that the lack of evidence of similar criminal incidents involving 
physical attacks on persons in a college parking lot meant that the kidnapping of a 
student from the lot was not reasonably foreseeable.174  The college was therefore 
not liable for allegedly negligent failure to keep the college premises safe.  
However, the trigger for liability is whether the harm was foreseeable, not whether 
there were similar incidents in the past.  If it is foreseeable that a student may fall 
from a window with a low sill and no safety bar, an action for negligence will lie 
even if no one fell from the window before.175
Constructive notice of a danger will establish the basis for liability, if the peril 
existed long enough that it should have been discovered and addressed through the 
exercise of reasonable care.176  There is no hard and fast rule as to how long is 
long enough.  In one recent case, a student’s slip-and-fall claim against a college 
failed because the allegedly dangerous condition of a rug existed only for “a short 
time” and had not actually been discovered.177
 173. See Fleming v. Lorain Cmty. Coll., No. 04CA008613, 2005 WL 1763609, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 27, 2005) (holding, in an action where a student was injured when the elevator she 
was entering dropped, that a statement in the student’s summary judgment motion that an 
unidentified maintenance worker told her “they had problems with the elevators all the time” was 
insufficient to create a triable issue as to whether the college knew of problems with the elevator, 
because the student presented no evidence that the worker was responsible for elevator or was 
referring to misleveling problems in particular). 
 174. Agnes Scott Coll., Inc., 616 S.E.2d at 470. 
 175. See Escobar v. Univ. of S. Cal., No. B166522, 2004 WL 2094602, at *17 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Sept. 21, 2004) (finding that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether a university maintained 
property in a dangerous condition that caused harm to a student who fell from a fourth floor 
window).  Addressing the significance to the fact that no one previously had fallen from the 
building, which was erected decades earlier, the Escobar court explained: 
In the area of landowner liability for third party crime, prior similar incidents play an 
important role in determining whether injury was foreseeable . . . . In cases involving 
liability for a dangerous condition of property, however, the existence or non-existence 
of prior similar incidents do not play this crucial role. . . . If the condition of property is 
such that the resulting danger can be identified by simple observation, the accident is 
foreseeable for purposes of duty analysis, and the question becomes whether the 
landowner took reasonable precautions in light of the observable danger presented. 
Id. at *7 (citations omitted). 
 176. See, e.g., Anjou v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 386, 386 (Mass. 1911) (holding 
that the discolored condition of a banana peel provided constructive notice of the danger); Mena 
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. G030447, 2004 WL 352707, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2004) 
(holding that there was “ample evidence the accumulated bird droppings had constituted a safety 
hazard on defendant’s property long enough for the jury to consider it a liability factor”).  Cf. 
Roddy v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll., No. 20094-03608, 2005 WL 894888, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 
Mar. 22, 2005) (holding that a college was not liable for injuries a student sustained in a fall as a 
result of water on a no-slip mat because there was no evidence the college had actual or 
constructive knowledge of accumulated water, which was an open and obvious condition that 
could have been easily avoided). 
 177. Holliman v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll., No. 2003-05470, 2004 WL 821662, at *2 
(Ohio Ct. Cl. Apr. 13, 2004) (denying recovery).  See also Deal v. State, No. A-01-07, 2003 WL 
717672, at *8 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003) (finding no liability for slip-and-fall on tracked-in 
water where there was “simply no evidence as to how long the puddle of water had existed . . . or 
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Some risks are foreseeable simply because of the nature of an enterprise.  If the 
design of a university baseball park makes it foreseeable that foul balls will strike 
patrons in the ticket line, the university may be held liable even if it produces 
evidence that no accident of that type previously occurred.178
Of course, duty and breach of duty are only part of what a plaintiff must 
establish in a negligence action.  Evidence that the breach caused damage is 
required.  Throwing a book bag in a classroom filled with students may be 
careless,179 but unless it strikes a student and causes harm, there is no liability. 
B. The Importance of Context 
Precisely what must be done to comply with the duty of reasonable care will 
vary greatly depending on the age and maturity of the participants in the program, 
as well as the nature of the program itself.180  Persons who have reached the age of 
majority may, to a very large extent, be treated as able-bodied adults, capable of 
protecting their own interests.  Courts have held that the doctrine of in loco 
parentis181 is obsolete with respect to college and university students.182  In 
contrast, there is less reason to indulge assumptions of self-sufficiency in the case 
of participants who are minors.183  A useful illustration concerns social host 
liability for providing alcohol. 
Most American states hold that a person who gives alcohol to an adult is not 
liable for harm that the recipient causes, either to another person or to himself or 
herself, as a result of intoxication.184  The assumption, in the eyes of the law, is 
that the employees . . . had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition”). 
 178. See Reider v. State ex rel. La. Bd. of Trs., 897 So. 2d 893, 896–97 (La. Ct. App. 2005) 
(affirming a judgment against the university). 
 179. Parsons v. Wash. State Cmty. Coll., No. 2004-04825, 2005 WL 2711216, at *3 (Ohio 
Ct. Cl. Sept. 29, 2005). 
 180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. l 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[B]ecause of the wide range of students to which it is 
applicable, what constitutes reasonable care is contextual—the extent and type of supervision 
required of young elementary school pupils is substantially different from reasonable care for 
college students.”). 
 181. In loco parentis is a Latin phrase meaning “in the place of a parent.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004). 
 182. See, e.g., Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 516–17 (Del. 1991) (“The concept of 
university control based on the doctrine of in loco parentis has all but disappeared in the face of 
the realities of modern college life where students ‘are now regarded as adults in almost every 
phase of community life.’” (citing Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1979))); 
McNeil v. Wagner Coll., 667 N.Y.S.2d 398 (App. Div. 1998) (stating that “New York has 
rejected the doctrine of in loco parentis at the college level”). 
 183. See Stanton v. Univ. of Me., 773 A.2d 1045, 1050 (Me. 2001) (noting that “young 
people, especially young women, . . . may not be fully conscious of the dangers that are present” 
and holding that a university owed a duty to a 17-year-old female student to warn her of the 
danger of sexual assault and advise her of steps she could take to improve her personal safety). 
 184. See Cole v. Rush, 289 P.2d 450, 457 (Cal. 1955) (declining to recognize social host 
liability); D’Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896, 899 (N.Y. 1987) (holding that an employees’ 
association, which provided free beer at a picnic, was not liable under common law for injuries 
resulting from employee’s intoxication). 
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that in such cases, the recipient is an “able-bodied”185 adult who can make 
decisions about how much to drink.  However, many states also hold that a social 
host who gives alcohol to a minor is liable for harm that the intoxicated minor 
inflicts on another individual or suffers personally.186  The director of a foreign 
educational program who encourages American law school students (who are 
typically age twenty-one or older) to attend a guest lecture at the local gasthaus by 
offering free beer and pretzels probably is not creating a risk of social host liability 
for the program provider.  However, another director who makes the same offer to 
students below the age of twenty-one may be venturing into uncertain legal 
territory.187  Even if consumption of alcohol by students that age is lawful at the 
foreign location, there is less reason for an American court to hold that the donor 
should escape liability for harm resulting from intoxication because the recipient, 
who was below the age of twenty-one, was an “able-bodied” adult.188
Similar issues may arise with respect to medical care for program participants.  
Suppose that a student becomes ill at the site of the foreign program and needs to 
be hospitalized.  May the director of the program defer to the student’s instruction 
that his or her parents are not to be notified?189  It is easier to say that the director 
 185. See Cole, 289 P.2d at 455 (holding that a patron’s surviving widow and minor children 
could not recover for alleged negligent furnishing of intoxicating liquor to the patron, who was an 
“able-bodied man”). 
 186. See Ely v. Murphy, 540 A.2d 54, 58 (Conn. 1988) (holding that a minor’s consumption 
of alcohol was not, as matter of law, an intervening cause that would insulate a social host or 
other provider of liquor from liability for ensuing injury to the minor or a third party); Congini v. 
Portersville Valve Co., 470 A.2d 515, 518 (Pa. 1983) (holding that social-host liability attaches in 
cases involving the negligent furnishing of alcoholic beverages to minors, but not to persons of 
drinking age); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1306 (Vt. 1986) (holding that a host may be 
liable for furnishing alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated person who will drive an 
automobile or to a minor). 
 187. See generally Lake, supra note 32, at 626–47 (discussing college and university liability 
for alcohol-related injuries).  The challenges posed by student consumption of alcohol are not 
new in American higher education.  In 1722, the rulebook at Yale University provided that “[i]f 
any student go into any tavern . . . he shall be obliged to confess his fault and be admonished and 
for ye second offense of ye same kind be Degraded and for ye third be expelled.”  Steve Olson, 
Half Full and Half Empty, 69 YALE ALMUNI MAG. 2, 42, 48 (Nov.–Dec. 2005). 
 188. See Congini, 470 A.2d at 518 (holding that a host was negligent per se in serving 
alcohol to the point of intoxication to person less than twenty-one years of age and that an action 
based on such negligence could be brought by the minor, not only by a third party).  In Congini, 
the court found that although there is “no common law liability on the part of a social host for the 
service of intoxicants to his adult guests” that rule is based on the assumption that the recipient is 
an “ordinary able bodied man.”  Id. at 517.  “However, our legislature has made a legislative 
judgment that persons under twenty-one years of age are incompetent to handle alcohol” and this 
legislative judgment compels a different result involving provision of alcohol to a minor “for here 
we are not dealing with ordinary able bodied men. . . . [W]e are confronted with persons who are, 
at least in the eyes of the law, incompetent to handle the affects of alcohol.”  Id. 
 189. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g 
(2000 & Supp. III 2003) imposes important limitations on dissemination of student information.  
It is not clear that FERPA would apply to this type of student information.  See Doe v. Knox 
County Bd. of Educ., 918 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (holding that § 1983 would support 
FERPA claims in an action where the educational records and medical condition of a student 
were disclosed to a newspaper and printed in an article); Commonwealth v. Buccella, 751 N.E.2d 
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has acted reasonably in acceding to that direction if the student has reached the age 
of majority. 
C. Customary Practices 
In general, conformance with customary practices in a calling or industry raises 
an inference of reasonableness (non-negligence) and departure from custom raises 
an inference of unreasonableness (negligence).190  Therefore, a foreign program 
that does what similar other foreign programs do (i.e., does what is customary) 
ordinarily has a reduced risk of liability based on following those practices.191
For example, suppose that program providers operating a particular type of 
program (e.g., on-site study for American law students conducted at a major 
university in a large western European city) customarily do not staff the foreign 
program office on weekends.  The rule on custom means that, absent unusual facts 
requiring special precautions, it will be hard to fault the provider for not having 
weekend staff hours to address student needs.  Conversely, if by reason of the age 
of the student participants, the difficulty of reaching the host country, or of moving 
between or within foreign cities, other similar programs customarily provide 
chaperoned transportation for students, it will be easier to argue that a program that 
fails to do so has fallen below the standard of care.192
The rule relating to custom means that it is important for a program provider to 
be aware of, and act consistently with, the current “state of the art” in 
administering foreign programs.  Moreover, if customary practices have been 
reduced to writing (e.g., as part of the standards that guide the accreditation of 
373, 388 n.3 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., concurring) (stating that “FERPA protections do not 
extend to . . . [certain] records of medical or psychological treatment” (citing 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 
(2001))).  See generally Ethan M. Rosenzweig, Comment, Please Don’t Tell: The Question of 
Confidentiality in Student Disciplinary Records Under FERPA and the Crime Awareness and 
Campus Security Act, 51 EMORY L.J. 447, 451–54 (2002) (discussing the history and purpose of 
FERPA). 
 190. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC 
PRINCIPLES) § 13 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) (discussing custom); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b (1965) (“Evidence of . . . custom is admissible, and is relevant, as 
indicating a composite judgment as to the risks of the situation and the precautions required to 
meet them, as well as the feasibility of such precautions, the difficulty of any change in accepted 
methods, the actor’s opportunity to learn what is called for, and the justifiable expectation of 
others that he will do what is usual, as well as the justifiable expectation of the actor that others 
will do the same.  If the actor does what others do under like circumstances, there is at least a 
possible inference that he is conforming to the community standard of reasonable conduct; and if 
he does not do what others do, there is a possible inference that he is not so conforming.”). 
 191. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. c (1965) (discussing when 
custom is not controlling). 
 192. In Bloss v. University of Minnesota Board of Regents, 590 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999), a student who was raped in Mexico by a taxi driver alleged that the state university which 
sponsored the cultural immersion program was negligent in failing to provide transportation 
between the home of the student’s host family and the city where the foreign program was located 
two-and-a-half miles away.  Id. at 662–63.  The appellate court confined its review to the issue of 
discretionary immunity, and concluded that decisions relating to whether transportation should be 
provided for program participants were immune from judicial review.  Id. at 665–66. 
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programs operating in foreign locations193), it is important for those practices to be 
observed, unless there is good reason for variation or unless the norms are merely 
aspirational.194  Of course, the standard for legal liability is not what is customary, 
but what is reasonable.195  A widespread customary practice (e.g., jaywalking in 
busy traffic or talking on a cell phone while driving) may be unduly dangerous, in 
which case conformance with custom does nothing to reduce the risk of 
liability.196
D. Voluntary Assumption of Duty 
The law continues to draw an important distinction between doing something 
badly (misfeasance) and not doing it at all (nonfeasance).197  The former often 
gives rise to liability because one who acts must act reasonably, but the latter may 
go unpunished on the ground that the defendant had no duty to act to protect the 
interests of the plaintiff.198  In two recent cases, for example, institutions of higher 
education, which had allegedly failed to protect students from harm caused by 
third persons, were found not liable for negligence.  In one case, a college was 
deemed to have no duty to protect a student from the negligence of an 
independently operated flight training school.199  In the other, a university was 
 193. See, e.g., SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, AMERICAN 
BAR ASS’N, FOREIGN SUMMER PROGRAMS—REVISED CRITERIA 6 (2003), available at http:// 
www.abanet.org/legaled/accreditation/foreignprogramtf/foreignsummerprogramscriteria.doc (“As 
part of the registration materials for the program, the school shall supply the U.S. State 
Department Consular Information Sheet for the country(ies) in which the program will be 
conducted; ‘Areas of Instability’ must be included.  If the Consular Information Sheet is revised 
during a program to announce an ‘Area of Instability’ in the region in which the program is being 
conducted, the updated information must be distributed promptly to students.”).  See also 
NAFSA: ASS’N FOR INT’L EDUCATORS, RESPONSIBLE STUDY ABROAD: GOOD PRACTICES FOR 
HEALTH AND SAFETY, available at http://www.secussa.nafsa.org/safetyabroad/goodpractices 
2003.html. 
 194. See Varner v. District of Columbia, 891 A.2d 260, 272 (D.C. 2006) (stating that 
“[a]spirational practices do not establish the standard of care” and “[t]o hold otherwise would 
create the perverse incentive for [universities and their administrators] to write [their manuals] in 
such a manner as to impose minimal duties upon [universities] in order to limit civil liability” 
(quoting Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632, 636 (D.C. 1997))). 
 195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. c (1965) (“No group of 
individuals and no industry or trade can be permitted, by adopting careless and slipshod methods 
to save time, effort, or money, to set its own uncontrolled standard at the expense of the rest of 
the community.  If the only test is to be what has always been done, no one will ever have any 
great incentive to make any progress in the direction of safety.”). 
 196. See id. (stating that “whenever the particular circumstances, the risk, or other elements 
in the case are such that a reasonable man would not conform to the custom, the actor may be 
found negligent in conforming to it; and whenever a reasonable man would depart from the 
custom, the actor may be found not to be negligent in so departing”). 
 197. See Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect 
Minor Children, 51 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311 n.1 (2006) (discussing misfeasance and nonfeasance). 
 198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 37 (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating general rule of no liability with respect to risks not created by 
the actor). 
 199. See Ingato v. Beisel, No. Civ. A. 03C05087SCD, 2005 WL 578814, at *1 (Del. Super. 
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held to have no duty to protect one student from injuries sustained while riding in 
the vehicle of a second sleep-deprived student.200
The new Restatement of Torts expressly recognizes that there is a special 
relationship between a school and a student which imposes on the school a duty to 
act to protect the student from harm.201  Case law raises serious doubts as to 
whether this rule applies to students in higher education.202  However, the 
Restatement commentary suggests that it does by noting that “what constitutes 
reasonable care is contextual—the extent and type of supervision required of 
young elementary school pupils is substantially different from reasonable care for 
college students.”203
In many instances, such as those involving premises liability claims, it may 
make little difference whether the student-school relationship is regarded as 
“special.”  The student will qualify as a business invitee204 or a tenant205 and the 
Ct. Feb. 28, 2005) (finding no duty despite the fact that the college had a degree requirement 
which necessitated that services be purchased from such a school). 
 200. See Slone v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 2000-02780, 2005 WL 2710720, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
Cl. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding no duty). 
 201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40(b)(5) 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (recognizing a special relationship between a school and its 
students). 
 202. See, e.g., Freeman v. Busch, 349 F.3d 582, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ince the late 1970s, 
the general rule is that no special relationship exists between a college and its own students 
because a college is not an insurer of the safety of its students.”); Schieszler v. Ferrun Coll., 236 
F. Supp. 2d 602, 608 (W.D. Va. 2002) (“The Virginia Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
issue of whether a special relationship may arise between a university or college and a student. . . 
. A number of cases in recent years have considered whether colleges and universities have a duty 
to take steps to protect students who voluntarily become intoxicated. . . . In the vast bulk of these 
cases, courts have concluded that no special relationship existed.”); Davidson v. Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill, 543 S.E.2d 920, 928 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that there was a special 
relationship between a cheerleader and university, but cautioning that the “holding should not be 
interpreted as finding a special relationship to exist between a university, college, or other 
secondary educational institution, and every student attending the school, or even every member 
of a student group, club, intramural team, or organization”); Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 1366, 
1370 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that “the university-student relationship does not in and of 
itself impose a duty upon universities to protect students from the actions of fellow students or 
third parties” (citing Nero v. Kan. State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 778 (Kan. 1993))).  But see 
Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg Coll., 989 F.2d 1360, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a college owed 
a student lacrosse player a duty of care based on a special relationship between the college and 
the student in his capacity as an intercollegiate athlete participating in a college-sponsored 
activity for which he had been recruited). 
 203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. l 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).  See also id. §40 reporters’ note to cmt. l (“In a number of 
contexts, [a duty of reasonable care] has been imposed on higher-education institutions, at least 
with regard to risks from conditions on the college’s property or risks created by the acts of others 
on the confines of college property.”). 
 204. See Bell v. Univ. of V.I., No. Civ. 2000-0062, 2003 WL 23517144, at *4 (D.V.I. Nov. 
19, 2003) (finding that a student was an invitee and that therefore a claim was stated based on 
allegedly negligent failure to protect the student from a dangerous professor); Muller v. Wright 
State Univ., No. 2002-10224-AD, 2003 WL 1735499, at *2 (Ohio Ct. Cl. Mar. 19, 2003) (holding 
that a student on state university property was an invitee while rehearsing for a play when she was 
injured by descending scenery, and therefore the university owed the student a duty of reasonable 
VINCENT JOHNSON 8/28/2006  6:16:12 PM 
350 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW [Vol. 32, No. 2 
 
legal principles applicable to persons with that status will entitle the student-invitee 
or student-tenant to what amounts to reasonable care.  However, in other cases, the 
precise nature of the student-school relationship may drive the legal analysis in a 
manner that may have important consequences.  For example, in a recent case206 
involving a student who was attacked in a dormitory, the court found that while the 
plaintiff  
may have been a business invitee as a student on the [university] 
campus generally in its common areas, dining halls, and academic 
buildings, . . . upon entering his dormitory building his legal status vis à 
vis [the university] was regulated more specifically by the Residence 
Hall Agreement, and thus he was a tenant of [the university] at the time 
of the battery.207   
Under the rules of premises liability, the court found there was no basis for liability 
because the roommate was not a dangerous or defective condition on the premises 
and the attack was unforeseeable.208
Regardless of the lens used for viewing a student’s claim against a program 
provider—status based on a business-invitee, landlord-tenant, or school-student 
relationship—the duties of the provider will be limited in two important respects.  
First, and most obvious, at some point the matter in question will be beyond the 
scope of the relationship.209  With respect to such matters, there is no duty to act.  
Second, within the scope of the relationship, applicable rules do not require every 
form of action that might be beneficial to a student.  Under one theory or another, 
the law will recognize certain basic duties, such as obligations to aid a student who 
is ill or injured,210 to provide facilities that are not dangerous,211 and (under some 
care). 
 205. See, e.g., Letsinger v. Drury Coll., 68 S.W.3d 408, 411 (Mo. 2002) (holding that issues 
of material fact existed as to whether there was a landlord-tenant relationship between summer 
occupant of a fraternity house and the college that owned the house, which would impose a duty 
of care). 
 206. Rhaney v. Univ. Md. E. Shore, 880 A.2d 357 (Md. 2005). 
 207. Id. at 367. 
 208. Id. at 365–66. 
 209. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40 cmt. l 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating that the duty owed by a school to its students by 
reason of that relationship is “only applicable to risks that occur while the student is at school or 
otherwise engaged in school activities”); see also Vistad v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., No. 
A04-2161, 2005 WL 1514633, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. June 28, 2005) (finding no special 
relationship between university and student-athlete in a sports program (basketball cheerleading) 
for which the university “handled some administrative tasks” but “otherwise exerted minimal 
control . . . [and] did not provide a coach to direct practices or otherwise impose rules on the 
participants”). 
 210. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (providing that an innkeeper 
owes its guest and a landowner owes persons who enter pursuant to a public invitation a duty “to 
take reasonable action (a) to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (b) to 
give them first aid after it knows or has reason to know that they are ill or injured, and to care for 
them until they can be cared for by others”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed Final Draft No 1, 2005) (discussing duty based 
on creating a risk of physical harm); Vilchis v. Miami Univ. of Ohio, 99 F. App’x 743, 745–46 
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circumstances) to protect students from attack by third parties.212  However, 
beyond these core obligations, there is great freedom of choice on the part of a 
program provider in electing what should be done.  Only if a provider undertakes a 
particular activity is a duty of care imposed.213
For example, there is generally no duty to provide off-campus transportation for 
college-age students.214  However, if transportation is provided, care must be 
(7th Cir. 2004) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction a claim against a university based on 
allegedly negligent failure to respond properly to an injured diver’s neck injury); Molinari v. 
Tuskegee Univ., 339 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1302–03 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (recognizing that tortious or 
even innocent involvement in an accident may give rise to a duty to render medical care, but 
finding it unnecessary to resolve that issue on the facts of the case). 
 211. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Community College’s Responsibility to Educate and 
Protect Students, 189 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 9 (2004) (asserting that “[s]tudents are entitled to a 
reasonably safe campus environment”). 
 212. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 786 So. 2d 927, 932 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that “a 
university likewise has a duty to implement reasonable measures to protect its students in 
dormitories from criminal acts when those acts are foreseeable”); Johnson v. State, 894 P.2d 
1366, 1370 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting a university-student theory of duty, but holding that 
a state university student who was abducted and raped near her dormitory was entitled to invitee 
status, and therefore the university had a duty to use reasonable care for her safety). 
 213. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42 (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing duty based on undertaking).  
 214. See Stockinger v. Feather River Cmty. Coll., 4 Cal Rptr. 3d 385, 398 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(holding that a community college and instructor had no duty to ensure that students had a safe 
means of transportation for performing an off-campus class assignment that involved mapping 
and planning of a horse packing trip, and therefore were not liable for injuries sustained by 
college student who was thrown from back of a pickup truck during the course of the assignment, 
even if such harm was foreseeable).  “College students are adults who, unlike children, are able to 
make their own responsible decisions about their own transportation.”  Id.  Addressing issues not 
dissimilar from those that might arise in connection with international education programs, the 
court wrote: 
[T]he duty owed to college students such as plaintiff is different from the duty owed to 
elementary and high school students. . . .  
  . . . [A] college must be able to give its students off-campus assignments, without 
specifying the mode of transportation, and without being saddled with liability for 
accidents that occur in the process of transportation.  A college instructor who gives an 
assignment requiring a trip to a library, or a tour of a city’s unique architectural 
buildings, should not be required to instruct the students on the need to drive at a safe 
speed and to wear a seatbelt while completing the assignment. . . .  
  . . . . 
  Plaintiff argues she has shown that defendants sent junior college students out into 
the “wilderness” without proper instruction, did nothing to ascertain that students 
would be traveling in a safe manner or in proper vehicles, did nothing to check the 
driving records or insurance information on those who were delegated as drivers, and 
offered no tutelage regarding safety with respect to the operation of off-road vehicles.  
However, . . . defendants had no duty to do any of those things.  
  . . . Even assuming . . . the harm to plaintiff was foreseeable, the connection 
between defendants’ alleged conduct (negligent failure to ensure safe travel) and 
plaintiff’s harm was not particularly close, nor was defendants’ conduct morally 
blameworthy, given that (1) the students were college students training to assume 
leadership roles in pack trips, and (2) plaintiff admitted she did not need to be told . . . 
that her actions were dangerous. . . . The extent of the burden on defendants, created by 
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exercised to protect students from travel-related injuries.215  So too, a provider 
need not tell students what vaccines are recommended for persons traveling to a 
particular country.  But if the provider does so, it must exercise care to ensure that 
the information is accurate and reliable.216  There is no rule of law that obliges an 
international education program to require students to have physicals to ensure that 
they are medically fit to travel.  But if the program provider elects to do so, it must 
exercise care in administering the tests and in collecting, retaining, and using the 
data that is assembled.217  Collecting medical information from students 
participating in a non-strenuous educational program in a foreign country where 
activities are similar to life in the United States would seem to be particularly 
unwise.  In that case, there are no special risks that would make the data especially 
useful, the collection of the information might expand the program provider’s 
sphere of negligence liability, and requiring applicants to go to the trouble of 
arranging a medical examination might be needlessly annoying and in some cases 
might cause students to not participate in the program or not recommend it to 
others.  (The latter point is important because student-to-student referrals are a 
major source of study abroad recruitment from one year to another.) 
The point here is that duties that do not otherwise exist may be assumed when 
providers undertake218 or promise to undertake219 certain activities.  A decision to 
engage in certain types of conduct—even if well-intended—may create a risk of 
liability where none would otherwise exist.220  In McNeil v. Wagner College,221 a 
a requirement that it protect every college student from reckless driving by fellow 
students during performance of what amounts to homework assignments, would be 
extraordinary, as would be the likely increase in the college district’s insurance 
premiums.  
Id. at 401–02 (citations omitted).   
 215. See McClure v. Fairfield Univ., 35 Conn. L. Rptr. 169 (Super. Ct. 2003) (holding that 
by “providing information about . . . beach area housing in the student binder” and establishing a 
“Safe-Rides program in which student volunteers used university-owned vans to provide rides to 
students traveling between the campus and the beach area” at night, the university “had assumed 
a responsibility for the safety of students while traveling between the beach area and the 
university campus”). 
 216. See Watson, supra note 1, at 8 (describing Pepperdine University’s efforts to update 
health-related information for countries where its students are studying).  
 217. Cf. Coffee v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. 503 P.2d 1366 (Cal. 1972) (stating that 
although “[a]n employer generally owes no duty to his prospective employees to ascertain 
whether they are physically fit for the job they seek, . . . where he assumes such duty, he is liable 
if he performs it negligently,” and therefore an employer could be held liable for administering a 
blood test and then failing to read and disclose to the applicant the adverse results). 
 218. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42 (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing duty based on undertaking).  
 219. See id. § 42 cmt. e (discussing promises as undertakings). 
 220. See Furek v. Univ. of Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991) (holding that a 
“[u]niversity’s policy against hazing, like its overall commitment to provide security on its 
campus, . . . constituted an assumed duty which became ‘an indispensable part of the bundle of 
services which colleges . . . afford their students’” (quoting Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 
N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1983))).  See generally Joseph Beckham & Douglas Pearson,  Negligent 
Liability Issues Involving Colleges and Students: Does a Holistic Learning Environment 
Heighten Institutional Liability?, 175 EDUC. L. REP. 379, 396 (2003) (stating that by “providing 
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student “slipped on ice and broke her ankle in a town in Austria, which she was 
visiting as part of an overseas program arranged by the defendant” college.222  In a 
subsequent lawsuit against the college, the student argued, not implausibly, that the 
program administrator “assumed the duty to act as an interpreter for her in the 
Austrian hospital and that she suffered nerve damage due to his failure to inform 
her of the treating physician’s recommendation that she undergo immediate 
surgery.”223  The court found that assuming, arguendo, that a duty was voluntarily 
undertaken, the suit against the college was without merit because the student had 
“failed to offer evidentiary proof to support her claim that [the administrator] was 
told of the recommendation of immediate surgery and negligently withheld that 
information from her.”224  Nevertheless, the threat of assumed-duty liability is 
clear.  The court noted that, aside from the assumed-duty theory, the defendant 
college “had no obligation to supervise the plaintiff’s health care following her 
accident.”225
In another medical-emergency case, Fay v. Thiel College,226 a female student 
became ill while participating in a study abroad program in Peru.  After the student 
“was admitted to a medical clinic, all of the faculty supervisors and all of the other 
students left on a prescheduled trip that was to last several days, leaving plaintiff 
alone at the clinic with only a Lutheran missionary . . . to act as plaintiff’s 
translator.”227  The student subsequently sued the college and others for harm she 
sustained at the clinic as a result of unnecessary surgery and sexual abuse 
committed by male personnel at the clinic.228  The defendants contended “that they 
had no special relationship with plaintiff beyond the fact that plaintiff was a 
student at Thiel College.”229  They further asserted that “since there was no special 
relationship between the parties, defendants owed plaintiff no special duty beyond 
that of a reasonable standard of care, and that defendants did not violate that 
reasonable standard of care in leaving plaintiff alone at the Peruvian medical 
clinic.”230  The court rejected this argument.  The college had required the student 
to sign a consent form that could be used in an emergency to authorize 
administration of an anesthetic or surgery.231  The court found that under the terms 
of the consent form, which assured signatories that the college wanted “to observe 
programs and services designed to complement classroom instruction and expand student 
development opportunities [such as study abroad] . . . colleges and universities may inadvertently 
be expanding a legal duty of care and placing themselves at increased risk for liability”). 
 221. 667 N.Y.S.2d 397 (App. Div. 1998). 
 222. Id. at 398. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id.  Another serious obstacle for the plaintiff was “evidence that her treating physician 
could speak English.”  Id. at 398. 
 225. Id. 
 226. 55 Pa. D. & C.4th 353 (Ct. Com. Pl. 2001). 
 227. Id. at 355. 
 228. Id. at 354–56.  
 229. Id. at 361. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 368. 
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the utmost precautions for the welfare of each participant,”232 “the faculty 
supervisors had a duty to ‘secure whatever treatment is deemed necessary, 
including the administration of an anesthetic and surgery.’”233  As a result, the 
court concluded that “Thiel College did owe plaintiff a special duty of care as a 
result of the special relationship that arose between Thiel College and plaintiff 
pursuant to the consent form”234 and could be held liable if “the lack of the 
presence of one or more of the faculty supervisors with plaintiff at the Peruvian 
medical clinic increased the risk of the male Peruvian doctors unnecessarily 
performing surgery on plaintiff and/or sexually assaulting plaintiff.”235  Thus, by 
reason of its decision to require a student to sign a consent to treatment form, the 
college inadvertently enlarged its exposure to liability. 
Another recent case also suggests that a college or university, by its conduct, 
may assume a legal duty that would not otherwise exist.  Schieszler v. Ferrum 
College236 involved a student suicide.  The court noted that “[w]hile it is unlikely 
that Virginia would conclude that a special relationship exists as a matter of law 
between colleges and universities and their students, it might find that a special 
relationship exist[ed] on the particular facts alleged in this case.”237  The college 
was aware of the student’s emotional problems, “required him to seek anger 
management counseling before permitting him to return to school for a second 
semester,” and, after finding the student “alone in his room with bruises on his 
head, . . . required [the student] to sign a statement that he would not hurt 
himself.”238
Suppose, for example, that a foreign educational program collects from 
participants information listing their allergies to medications, but then misplaces 
the forms, with the result that the information is not available when an injured 
student who is unconscious needs medical care.  That type of negligence is garden-
variety misfeasance, and the program provider may be liable for harm caused by 
administration of medication to which the student was allergic.  In contrast, if the 
provider never collected such information in the first place, a court might well hold 
that there was no duty to do so and that there is no liability for harm caused by 
administering the medication to which the student was allergic. 
Should a program provider gather information about the prior discipline of 
students who apply to a study abroad program?  That information may make it 
possible for the program provider to anticipate problems that might arise, but it 
also is likely to expand the provider’s exposure to liability.  First, cases often hold 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 363. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 366. 
 236. 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002).  See also Nova Se. Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So. 
2d 86, 89 (Fla. 2000) (holding that because a university had “control over the students’ conduct 
by requiring them to do the practicum and by assigning them to a specific location, it also 
assumed the Hohfeldian correlative duty of acting reasonably in making those assignments”). 
 237. Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 609. 
 238. Id.  
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that when information is collected, the collector has a duty to review the data.239  
Second, if the information that is gathered identifies risks that should be addressed, 
a court is likely to hold that the failure to do so is negligence.  Consequently, it can 
prudently be urged that unless there is a particular need for personal information 
relating to program participants, that information should not be solicited. 
Information relating to disabilities would seem to be particularly problematic.  
Once a disability is identified, a program provider will be hard pressed to exclude 
the student from participation in the program or to deny accommodations.  
Whether the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) applies to educational 
programs operated at foreign sites has not yet been definitively resolved by the 
courts.240  However, such a claim is colorable, and a denial of participation or 
accommodations runs the risk of embroiling a study abroad program in litigation. 
VII. MISREPRESENTATION AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Misrepresentation241 claims against colleges and universities are not 
uncommon.242  Numerous suits against higher education institutions and others 
 239. Cf. Waffen v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 799 F.2d 911, 913–15 (4th Cir. 
1996) (indicating that where an x-ray of the plaintiff was misplaced and never reviewed by 
doctors, the defendant National Institutes of Health stipulated that it violated the applicable 
standard of care by its negligence), abrogated by Hurley v. United States, 923 F.2d 1091, 1095 
n.27 (4th Cir. 1991).  
 240. See Arlene S. Kanter, The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality as Applied to 
Disability Discrimination Laws: Where Does That Leave Students with Disabilities Studying 
Abroad, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 291, 291 (2003) (“[T]he extent to which the ADA, or its 
predecessor statute, the Rehabilitation Act, applies extraterritorially to conduct and Americans 
overseas remains unresolved.”).  
 241. An action for fraud (sometimes called deceit) offers a remedy for false or misleading 
statements that are made with “scienter”—meaning knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for 
the truth.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–51 (1965) (discussing liability for 
fraudulent misrepresentation).  A parallel action for negligent misrepresentation provides 
compensation for physical harm or economic losses resulting from carelessly false or misleading 
statements.  See id. § 552 (discussing liability for negligent misrepresentation).  In addition, state 
consumer protection laws afford students other remedies for misrepresentations made by colleges 
and universities.  See, e.g., Emily Heffter & Nick Perry, Student Takes on College and Wins, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 24, 2006, at B1 (discussing a jury verdict which found that a for-profit 
“college violated the state Consumer Protection Act by failing to tell [a student] that her credits 
wouldn’t transfer”).  In general, the rules on misrepresentation ignore statements that pose little 
risk of harm because they are unlikely to be relied upon (e.g., vague “puffing,” mere predictions, 
and personal opinions).  See Maness v. Reese, 489 S.W.2d 660, 663 (Tex. App. 1972) 
(“[P]redictions and opinions do not serve as a basis for actionable fraud.”); Hedin v. Minneapolis 
Med. & Surgical Inst., 64 N.W. 158, 159 (Minn. 1895) (“Generally speaking, . . . mere matters of 
opinion or conjecture . . . are not actionable.”); Johnson & Lovorn, supra note 155, at 551–52 
(discussing the rule that puffing is permissible).  The rules also impose liability for misleading 
representations which, by reason of the source or circumstances, cause harm to others by inducing 
misplaced reliance (e.g., misstatements of fact, half-truths, expert opinions, and silence by 
persons who have a legal duty to speak).  Id. at 536–54 (discussing outright lies, half-truths, 
opinions, and silence). 
 242. See Harmon v. Sullivan Univ. Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A. 03-738-C, 2005 WL 1353752, at 
*3–6 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2005) (holding that a claim was stated with respect to fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation of the accreditation of the university); Gomes v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 365 F. 
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have been based on alleged misrepresentations concerning the safety of a facility 
or neighborhood.243  In the study abroad context, the easiest way to chart a safe 
course through the thickets of misrepresentation law is to provide information that 
is accurate and to make disclosures that a student and his or her family would find 
useful in deciding whether to participate in the program.  A provider operating a 
foreign program should provide students, in a timely manner, with the current U.S. 
Department of State’s Consular Information Sheet for the country in which the 
program operates, or should advise students to access that information on the 
web.244  Consular Information Sheets contain data about crime and other dangers 
faced by American travelers.  By ensuring that this information is expressly called 
to the attention of students, a program provider takes an important step in fending 
off safety-related misrepresentation claims. 
In addition, program representatives should never portray a foreign location as 
safer than they know it to be.  A statement made by a person who lacks the 
confidence or factual basis that the statement implies is a misrepresentation made 
with scienter.245  If a foreseeable recipient of the statement detrimentally relies 
upon those false assurances of safety, an action for deceit will lie.  The same is true 
of an intentional half-truth.  In a recent case, Minger v. Green, the Sixth Circuit 
held that a cause of action for intentional misrepresentation was stated by the 
mother of a student who had died in a dormitory fire.246  The complaint alleged 
that the associate director of the housing office had failed to tell her, in response to 
her inquiries regarding an earlier fire, of the possibility that the fire had been 
intentionally set, and had discouraged the mother from contacting the fire 
department to further investigate the fire.247
Misrepresentation claims have been asserted by students based on statements 
made in connection with study abroad programs.  In Bird v. Lewis & Clark 
College,248 a student alleged, among other claims,249 that a college had committed 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty by inaccurately 
Supp. 2d 6, 47–48 (D. Me. 2005) (discussing a failed claim relating to a disciplinary hearing); 
Shelton v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., No. 04 Civ. 6714(AKH), 2005 WL 2898237, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 1, 2005) (discussing a failed claim relating to a plagiarism hearing). 
 243. See Minger v. Green, 239 F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that a claim for deceit 
was stated with respect to misrepresentation of the safety of a dormitory); see, e.g., O’Hara v. W. 
Seven Trees Corp. Intercoast Mgmt., 142 Cal. Rptr. 487, 491 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a 
complaint was stated for fraud relating to misrepresentation of the safety of an apartment 
complex). 
 244. U.S. Dep’t of State, Consular Information Sheets, http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_ 
tw/cis/cis_1765.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
 245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 (1965) (providing that a 
misrepresentation is “fraudulent” if the speaker “(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he 
represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his representation that he 
states or implies, or (c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation that he states 
or implies”). 
 246. Minger, 239 F.3d at 800. 
 247. Id. 
 248. 303 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 249. Id. at 1019.  See supra note 22 (listing the various causes of action alleged by the 
student). 
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portraying its ability to accommodate her disabilities in its study abroad program in 
Australia.250  The jury found against the student on all claims, except breach of 
fiduciary duty, for which it awarded $5000 in damages.251  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, stating: 
 Although the College contends that it owed no fiduciary duties to 
Bird, ample evidence exists in the record for the jury to make a contrary 
finding.  The College assured Bird on a number of occasions that the 
overseas program would accommodate her disability.  Darrow [the 
faculty director of the program] e-mailed Bird’s parents and assured 
them that Global (the company handling the travel arrangements) and 
Meyers (the director of the College’s overseas program) “commonly 
handle people both in the field and in home stays that are more 
physically challenged than [Bird].”  Darrow also indicated that adequate 
facilities would be available in most of the outdoor trips. 
 Bird also had reason to trust Darrow’s assurances.  Shortly after her 
injury, the College worked closely with Bird to ensure that she could 
navigate comfortably around [the home] campus.  It installed ramps at 
her dormitory, changed its inside doors, and remodeled its bathrooms to 
make them wheelchair-accessible.  It even rebuilt parts of the biology 
labs where she worked.  Based on these facts, the jury could have 
concluded that a “special relationship” developed between the parties.  
There was no error in allowing that question to go to the jury.252
Bird is a sobering decision.  Read at face value it suggests that any time a 
college or university complies with demands of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act 
at the home campus and assures a student that it can do so at a foreign location,253 
the provider opens itself up to a tort claim254 for breach of fiduciary duty if the 
accommodations at the foreign site fall short of the student’s expectations.  It is 
significant that in Bird the Ninth Circuit affirmed the student’s breach of fiduciary 
duty verdict even though it also affirmed jury findings that there was no 
discrimination on the basis of disability and no violation of the ADA or the 
Rehabilitation Act.255  In addition, the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
between a higher education institution and a student triggers heightened 
 250. Bird, 303 F.3d at 1017.  “Bird was informed that she could not participate in several 
activities due to her disability, but that alternative activities would be arranged.  Bird was 
otherwise assured that the program would be able to accommodate her disability.”  Id.  
 251. Id. at 1019. 
 252. Id. at 1023–24. 
 253. See id. at 1017.  Although the college contended that Title III and the Rehabilitation Act 
do not apply extraterritorially to regulate the administration of overseas programs, the court did 
not reach that issue in view of its denial of equitable relief.  Id. at 1021 n.1. 
 254. According to the American Law Institute, breach of fiduciary duty is a tort.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1965) (“One standing in a fiduciary relation with 
another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the 
relation.”). 
 255. Bird, 303 F.3d at 1019.  The Ninth Circuit found that the college “offered ample 
evidence of having accommodated Bird’s disability.”  Id. at 1021. 
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obligations under the law of misrepresentation.256  A fiduciary is readily held 
liable for failure to disclose material information to the beneficiary of the 
relationship, particularly where the interests of the fiduciary and beneficiary are 
adverse.257  Bird means that foreign program providers should exercise 
considerable caution in the statements they make about being able to accommodate 
students with disabilities.  Otherwise there may be an increased risk of liability 
both for breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation. 
VIII. CONCLUSION: WISDOM OF EXPERIENCE 
Perhaps the single most important factor in minimizing the risk of legal liability 
associated with study abroad programs lies in the field of personnel decisions, 
rather than legal principles.  The persons chosen to direct and teach in foreign 
educational programs must have good judgment, must be willing to work hard, and 
must have adequate support from colleagues on site to enable the program to 
succeed.  At a foreign study location, there is an endless array of matters—some 
important, many trivial—that require attention:  classroom building access, 
housing accommodations, travel arrangements, visiting guests, teaching schedules, 
special events, internet availability, and on and on.  If the administrative staff is 
inexperienced, under-resourced, or not motivated, it is likely that at least some of 
the issues relating to program participant safety may not be given the attention they 
deserve. 
Continuity of leadership in the administration of a study abroad program can 
also be a great asset.  The “institutional memory” that such persons bring to the 
enterprise can be the difference between success and failure, or at least between 
few or no complaints and a merely adequate performance.  Past experience at the 
host site, or even experience with operating foreign programs in other locations, 
enables those in charge to better anticipate the problems that may arise and to 
distinguish serious risks from ones that should be accorded less priority.  The 
resources that a program has to succeed—particularly staff time, but also money—
must be employed wisely in a manner that optimizes the educational experience 
(including safety).  A foreign program that changes its administration too 
frequently, that hires persons with little inclination for the endless administrative 
tasks, or that tries to conduct study abroad programs in too many parts of the 
globe, may be found trying to surmount the safety learning curve at a moment 
when action is needed. 
Of course, a foreign program is most likely to succeed where the administrative 
staff and faculty genuinely care about the students.  Nothing worse can be said 
 256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1965) (“One party to a business 
transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the 
transaction is consummated . . . matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because 
of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.”). 
 257. See generally Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 737, 771 (2003) (discussing the disclosure obligations of attorneys as fiduciaries of 
clients, and stating that the duties are most extensive “where the interests of the attorney and 
client are adverse”).  See also Johnson, supra note 155, at 295–96 (discussing the disclosure 
obligations of fiduciaries at they relate to database security). 
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about a study abroad endeavor than that those running it were not interested in the 
quality of the educational experience and treated the time abroad as a personal 
vacation with which students should not interfere.  The ultimate goal for every 
foreign educational program must be to provide students with a first-rate 
educational experience that could not be duplicated in the United States.  Students 
should return to their home campuses stimulated by their foreign classes, enriched 
by cultural experiences, and better equipped to assume the role of well-educated 
world citizens. 
Like many laudable activities that were once conducted with little thought of 
civil liability, international education programs must now be operated with due 
regard for the legal principles that impose a general duty of reasonable care, that 
punish misrepresentation, and that award compensation for injuries attributable to 
blameworthy conduct.  This is a good development, for it discourages irresponsible 
practices and creates incentives for safety.  The proper response of program 
providers to the risk of tort liability is neither to withdraw from the market of 
international education nor to conduct programs with obsessive concern about the 
threat of litigation.  Rather, program providers must simply exercise reasonable 
care to prevent unnecessary harm to study abroad participants.  That is all that the 
law requires:  reasonably prudent conduct.258  Adherence to good practices 
comporting with that duty will neither seriously harm foreign educational ventures 
nor waste opportunities for achieving optimal safety in the field of international 
education.  Attention to threats of unnecessary harm can improve the study abroad 
experience for all concerned. 
 258. Cf. Eagleson v. Kent State Univ., No. 2001-06304, 2003 WL 21061358, at *3 (Ohio Ct. 
Cl. May 5, 2003) (holding that a university was not liable for injuries sustained by a conference 
attendee when a chair collapsed because there was no actual or constructive notice of a defect and 
the university’s method of inspecting chairs twice a year was reasonable). 
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